Cornell Law Review
Volume 66
Issue 5 June 1981

Article 4

Legal Positivism of John Austin and the Realist
Movement in American Jurisprudence
Wilfrid E. Rumble

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Wilfrid E. Rumble, Legal Positivism of John Austin and the Realist Movement in American Jurisprudence, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 986 (1981)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol66/iss5/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

THE LEGAL POSITIVISM OF JOHN AUSTIN AND
THE REALIST MOVEMENT IN
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
Wilfrid E. Rumblet
"The house of jurisprudence," Morris and Felix Cohen wrote,
"has many mansions." '
Unfortunately, systematic comparison of
these diverse structures is not a widespread scholarly practice. Comparative analysis is essential for understanding the true
distinctiveness of the various traditions of jurisprudence and is indispensable for assessing new theoretical developments. This assumption
underlies this study, which compares the ideas of John Austin with
those of the legal realists.
Austin was the most influential figure in English jurisprudence
for the last third of the nineteenth century and for much of this
century. During his lifetime, he was a prophet without honor. He
published his one completed work on jurisprudence, The Province of
JurisprudenceDetermined,2 in 1832. It did not receive great attention,
although a few journals reviewed it very favorably. 3 Within a few
years of his death, however, "it was clear that his work had established the study of jurisprudence in England. And it is now clear that
Austin's influence on the development in England of the subject has
been greater than that of any other writer. "4

t Professor of Political Science, Vassar College. B.A. 1953, University of Minnesota;
M.A. 1956, University of Minnesota; Ph.D. 1961, The Johns Hopkins University.
I READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 370 (M. Cohen & F. Cohen eds.

1951).
2

See

J.

AUSTIN,

THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE

STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE (1954) [hereinafter cited as PROVINCE]. Austin's lectures on jurisprudence were published posthumously. See J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE
PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW "(5th ed. R. Campbell 1885) (1st ed. 1863) [hereinafter cited as
LECTURES]. For bibliographies of Austin, see Hart, BibliographicalNote, PROVINCE, supra, at xix;

Rumble, Divine Law, UtilitarianEthics, and PositivistJurisprudence:A Study of the Legal Philosophy of
John Austin, 24 AM. J. JURIS. 139 n.1 (1979).
' See, e.g., Book Review, 18 WESTMINSTER REV. 249 (1833); Book Review, 7 L. MAGAZINE
REV. 313 (1832).
' Hart, Introduction, in PROVINCE, supra note 2, at xvi. Carleton K. Allen claimed that

Austin was the author of "the characteristic jurisprudence of England." C. K. ALLEN, LAW IN
THE MAKING 7 (7th ed. 1964). The publication of H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law probably
requires modification of this assessment. Nevertheless, Austin had a profound impact upon
English jurisprudence.
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The legal realists were not as influential in this country as Austin
had been in England. In addition, they evoked a storm of protest that
was quite unlike the reaction to Austin's teachings. 5 Still, the realist
movement, was the most significant development in American jurisprudence in the period between the two world wars. Despite the
controversy generated by the realists, they have had a substantial
impact on legal thought in this country. Jerome Hall had good
grounds for asserting that "most legal scholars in the United States,
from the late twenties on, have been realists in important respects;
' 6
and the polemics of the thirties should not obscure that fact.
Although recent developments in American jurisprudence may require qualification of Hall's statement, 7 many of the ideas produced
by the realist movement are likely to retain considerable vitality.
This interpretation presumes that it is possible to generalize
accurately about the notions of the legal realists. To take this position,
however, is not to deny the difficulty of the task. "What the curious
episode which we call American Legal Realism was about," Grant
Gilmore observed, "has long been a puzzle not only to outsiders but
to the participants" as well. 8 Such bewilderment is probably inevitable. There is no universal standard for determining who is a legal
realist. 9 Theorists generally classified as realists frequently disagreed

s See, e.g., works cited in W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 29 n.53 (1968).

j.

HALL, STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND CRIMINAL THEORY 136-37 (1958).

7 See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977), which, in many respects, is a
defense of ideas that cut deeply against the grain of the realist movement.
8 G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 78 (1977).
1 See W. RUMBLE, supra note 5, at I n. I for my classification of the realists, which relies
heavily upon Karl Llewellyn's 1931 list of realists. See K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 74-76 (1962) [hereinafter cited as JURISPRUDENCE]. I have also added

Thurman Arnold, Felix Cohen, and Fred Rodell to Llewellyn's group of realists. William
Twining has criticized my selection of realists as "unnecessarily arbitrary." W. TWINING,
KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 409 n.24 (1973). This is an accurate description
insomuch as Twining implies that I gave no reasons for the selections. If, however, Twining
meant to say that no reasonable basis exists for my selections, his criticism is unfounded. I rely
heavily upon Llewellyn's list of realists for the following reasons: (1) Because Llewellyn
maintained a pivotal role in the realist movement, he was in a good position to judge who the
other participants in it were; (2) Llewellyn persuasively explained the basis for his selections.
See K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra, at 46-47 n. 18; (3) Jerome Frank, who also played a

major role in the realist movement, collaborated with Llewellyn in the preparation of the article
and list. Llewellyn wrote, "Jerome Frank refused me permission to sign his name as joint
author to this paper, on the ground that it was my fist which pushed the pen. But his generosity
does not alter the fact that the paper could not have been written without his help. I therefore
write the first sections, in partial recognition, as 'We,' meaning thereby Frank and myself."
Id. at 42 n.*. These sections include the explanation of the basis for selecting the men described
as realists. Reliance upon the judgment of two of the most important figures in the realist
movement is not, I submit, an unreasonable modus operandi.
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with each other.1 0 They also modified some of their ideas in the
course of their lives.'
Nevertheless, one can discern certain tendencies in the work of men generally acknowledged to be legal realists.' 2
Although the realists may appear to have had little in common
with Austin, this perception is inaccurate. Even if it is unlikely that
Austin directly influenced the realists, at least he shared a number of
important ideas with them.' 3 It is not my purpose, however, to

Thurman Arnold and Felix Cohen may also legitimately be classified as realists. Edwin
W. Patterson, a friend and colleague of many of the realists on Llewellyn's list, wrote that
Arnold and Cohen could be included "with justification." E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE:
MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 538 n.7 (1953). Llewellyn evidently believed that Arnold was a
legal realist: "Arnold has joyously demonstrated (a) that he is still as tough a realist as he ever
was, and (b) that realism is still 'a sustaining food."' K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 509 n.1 (1960) [hereinafter cited as DECIDING APPEALS]. Frank
also perceived Arnold to be a realist. See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND Xi (1963)
[Unless otherwise noted, citations to LAW AND MODERN MIND are to the original 1930 edition.].
Felix Cohen's status as a realist may be more debatable than Arnold's, but it is still supportable. Cohen agreed with virtually all of the nine "points of departure" that the realists shared,
see K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra, at 55-57, although his writings on problems of ethical
theory differentiated him from virtually all of the other realists. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS
AND LEGAL IDEALS: AN ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL CRITICISM (1959) [hereinafter
cited as ETHICAL SYSTEMS]; THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN
(L.K. Cohen ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE]. In addition, Cohen has
been described as "the best balanced and one of the most creative voices in the literature of
what is loosely called American legal realism." Rostow, Introduction, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra, at xvi.
Fred Rodell taught at the Yale Law School for most of his professional life; he was not a
major figure in the development of the realist movement. His books include F. RODELL, WOE
UNTO You, LAWYERS! (1957) and F. RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT FROM 1790 TO 1955 (1955). Some of the ideas developed in these works are so
extreme that they are not representative of realist thought. For an interesting criticism of some
of Rodell's views, see Frank, Introduction, in F. RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS! (1957). It

may, therefore, be desirable not to regard Rodell as a realist. His works are not a basis for my
interpretation of the realist movement, although some of his ideas are possible developments
from positions shared by the realists. To this extent, the classification of Rodell as a realist is
useful for indicating the extremes to which some of the realists' ideas could be taken.
10 See, e.g., Frank, Book Review, 40 YALE L.J. 1120 (1931); Llewellyn, Book Review, 31
COLUM. L. REv. 82 (1931).
n See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 9, at viii-xx; K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 9 (1960);
E. PURCELL, DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 173

(1973).
12 For an interpretation of the realist movement that argues against generalizing about it
after 1928, see W. TWINING, supra note 9, at 82. Twining's interpretation should be compared

with that of Grant Gilmore, supra note 8, at 78.
I believe some generalization is both possible and necessary. Otherwise, it would be
impossible to speak accurately of the "realist" movement or to classify anyone as a "realist."
It is one thing to contend that generalizations about tendencies require exceptions, or are in
some instances impossible. It is another thing to argue that no kind of generalization, however
careful and qualified, is possible.
13 The extent to which most of the realists were even familiar with Austin's work is an open
question. Arthur L. Corbin "claimed that he had never read Austin," W. TWINING, supra note
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establish that Austin influenced even indirectly the legal realists.
Rather, it is to explain the most important similarities and differences
between his philosophy of positive law and legal realism. As such, this
Article is not a definitive analysis of Austin and the realists and it does
not answer the following questions: (1) To the extent that Austin and
the realists agreed, are their ideas well-founded? and (2) If they
disagreed, whose position is most satisfactory? Even so, this study
should lay the foundation for a comparative evaluation of the ideas of
these major contributors to Anglo-American jurisprudence.
I
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AUSTIN AND THE REALISTS

Although the most novel feature of this study may be its explanation of the similarities between Austin and the realists, this interpretation is in no way intended to deny the existence of numerous and
important differences between them. First, their intellectual orientations were quite dissimilar. Austin lived prior to the impact of Darwinism and the emergence of the modern social sciences. He was an
admirer of Hobbes and Locke, a disciple of Jeremy Bentham, and an
ardent utilitarian.14 Austin was also a staunch Malthusian, a strong
econbeliever in the truths of the "inestimable science of political
6
omy," '1' 5 and, by the end of his life, an arch-conservative.1
The legal realists viewed the world through very different spectacles. As Walter Wheeler Cook observed, "[t]hey have all . . .been

influenced to a greater or less extent by currents of thought which are
running today in all fields of intellectual endeavor."1 7 Karl N. Llewellyn identified some of these currents when he characterized the
9, at 29, and the index to K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, contains no reference to
Austin. The realist movement was essentially a response to American conditions, problems,

and writers. The most important such writer probably was Justice Holmes, who aptly has been
dubbed the "hero figure of the [realist] clan." Jones, Legal Realism and Natural Law, in THE
NATURE OF LAW 262 (M. Golding ed. 1966). If Holmes had a profound effect upon the realists,
the possibility exists that Austin had an indirect impact on their movement, because, unlike
most of the realists, Holmes was very familiar with Austin's work. According to one commentator, "Holmes read Austin's works five times" between 1863 and 1871, and "[tihe Austinian
strain in Holmes's thought was vigorous and persistent." M. HOWE, JUsTICE OLIVER WENDELL

HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS 1841-1870, at 194 & n.d (1957). For two of Holmes's discussions
of Austin, see Holmes, The Law Magazine and Review, 6 AM. L. REV. 593 (1872), reprinted in 44
HARV.L. REV. 788 (1931), and Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1
(1870), reprinted in 44 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1931).
14 See Rumble, supra note 2, at 144-47.
15 J. AUSTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 2, at 66.
16 SeeJ. AUSTIN, A PLEA FOR THE CONSTITUTION (1859).
17 Cook, Williston on Contracts, 33 ILL. L. REV. 497 n.2 (1938).
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realist movement as "of a piece with the development of objective
method in psychology. It fits into the pragmatic and instrumental
developments in logic. It seeks to capitalize the methodological worries that have been working through in these latter years to new
approaches in sociology, economics, political science." 8 Behaviorism, pragmatism, and instrumentalism, as well as the disciplines of
sociology and political science, were unknown when Austin delivered
his lectures on jurisprudence. In addition, the legal realists were
generally less conservative politically than Austin. 9
Despite the common law heritage of both Austin and the realists,
their attitudes toward and knowledge of case law were quite different.
Holmes once wrote that the "trouble with Austin was that he did not
know enough English Law." 2 0 If Austin did know much about
English law, it is not evident from his writings. Virtually all of the
legal realists, however, demonstrated a thorough familiarity with
cases. In fact, several of them were masters of particular areas of case
law. 2 ' In any event, the realists were more concerned with and
knowledgeable of case law than Austin.
Furthermore, Austin and the realists had different fields of professional specialization. Austin, a legal positivist, was primarily a
philosopher of law. None of the realists (with one or two possible
exceptions2 2 ) could accurately be classified in this way. Several realists

K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 28 (footnotes omitted).
19 For discussion of the political outlook of the realists, see E. PURCELL, supra note 11; W.
RUMBLE,

supra note 5, at 76-77; W. VOLKOMER, THE PASSIONATE LIBERAL: THE POLITICAL AND
(1970); G. WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT

SOCIAL IDEAS OF JEROME FRANK

(1978).
20 O.W. HOLMES, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 87 (M. Lerner ed. 1943).
1 See, e.g., A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1947). Corbin has been described as possibly the
first and the greatest of the "post-Langdellian scholars." G. GILMORE, supra note 8, at 79. To
be sure, Corbin "took no part in the Realist controversy-his intellectual formation had been
complete long before World War I." Id. Nevertheless, Llewellyn maintained that one of
Corbin's articles, see Corbin, The Law and the Judges, 3 YALE REV. 234 (1914), was "the first
rounded presentation of the realistic attitude, except for Holmes and Bingham." K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 46 n.18, 47.
2 Felix Cohen and Walter Wheeler Cook are the most likely exceptions. Cohen's father
was Morris R. Cohen, the highly respected American philosopher. Felix Cohen received M.A.
and Ph.D. degrees in philosophy from Harvard in 1927 and 1929, respectively, and graduated
from the Columbia Law School in 1931. His major works in legal philosophy are F. COHEN,
ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 9 and THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 9. Unlike most of the
other realists, Walter Wheeler Cook never practiced law. After his graduation from Columbia
in 1894, he studied mathematical physics in Germany from 1895 to 1897. He appears to have
been more widely read in the literature of the philosophy of science than any other realist.
Many of his publications were designed to explain the implications of this philosophy for the
study of law. See Cook, A Scientific Approach to the Study of Law, in ESSAYS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE:
IN HONOR OF WESTIL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY 201-07 (J. Mathews & J. Hart. eds. 1937);
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were interested in the philosophy of law, and some of their ideas
amount to sophisticated and valuable contributions to this field of
study. Moreover, "philosophy of law" may be subject to an interpretation that would enable some realists to be classified as legal philosophers. Still, this characterization certainly would not apply to many of
the exponents of "realistic jurisprudence." To this extent, Llewellyn
correctly asserted that "[r]ealism was never a philosophy" although it
2 3
was "persistently treated as such."1
A. Conceptions of Law
The legal realists developed conceptions of law that differed in
several respects from Austin's views. He believed that he had identified the nature or essence of law. Thus, he repeatedly distinguished
between law properly, and improperly, "so called." ' 24 Law properly
"so called" consists of general commands or imperatives, which Austin sharply contrasted with occasional or particular commands. The
example par excellence of the latter is a judicial decision, such as the
order that a particular thief receive a specific sentence. Austin maintained that this kind of decree "would not be a law or rule, but an
occasional or particular command of the sovereign One or Number." ' 25 In other words, the particularity of judicial decisions or
orders prevents them from properly being called law.
Austin stressed that the subject matter of jurisprudence is positive
law, or law strictly so called, which he described as the express or tacit
commands of the sovereign. This supreme and legally illimitable
power is the ultimate source of every legal rule in an independent
political society. Austin acknowledged that subordinate officials (such
as judges) make law, but he emphasized that they do so at the pleasure
of the sovereign. 2' The sovereign is identifiable, he argued, by two
characteristics: habitual obedience from the bulk of the population,
and habitual noncompliance with the commands of any other human
27
superior.

Cook, The PossibilitiesofSocial Study as a Science, in ESSAYS ON RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

(1931); Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A.J. (1927). For discussions of Cook's
philosophy of science and his efforts to apply scientific methods to the study of law, see W.
TWINING, supra note 9, at 37-40, 378-81, and Verdun-Jones, Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema: The
Scientific Wing of American Legal Realism, 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 249, 261-66 (1979).
'

K. LLEWELLYN, DECIDING APPEALS, supra note 9, at 509 & n.2.

24 J. AUSTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 2, at 1-3.

2 Id. at 21.
8 Id. at 31-33.
2 Id. at 193-94.
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To turn from Austin's efforts to define law to similar efforts on
the part of the legal realists is to enter a different universe. Some
realists became so disenchanted with the war of words about the
nature of law that they refused to enter, or at least continue, the
battle. 2 Despite these disclaimers, however, there was a significant
difference between Austin and the realists as to how they defined the
law and what they expected to achieve from such definitions. The
realists' approach was much more pragmatic, or instrumentalist, than
Austin's. The pragmatic approach views definitions as tools or means
to an end, the value of which is relative to the purpose of the definition. Felix Cohen lucidly expressed this perspective when he wrote
that "[a] good deal of fruitless controversy has arisen out of attempts
to show that [a] definition of law . .. is either true or false. A

definition of law is useful or useless. It is not true orfalse, any more than
a New Year's resolution or an insurance policy.' '29
Most of the exponents of realistic jurisprudence were convinced
of the uselessness of conceiving of law as merely rules or principles.
Instead, they emphasized the significance of concrete, official decisionmaking. Although the realists rarely denied the possibility or
importance of accurate generalizations about these decisions- indeed,
a characteristic theme of the realist movement was the call for the
development of such propositions 3 0-they maintained that the validity
of these generalizations should be tested against actual decisions, or
enforced rules. "The 'realists' will of course at once inquire," Walter
Wheeler Cook observed, "whether . . . broad generalizations will

'account for' the 'law' as it is found in the decisions. From their point
3
of view that is the acid test of the validity of any generalization." 1
For example, consider the question of the existence of a contract:
When the realist asks this question, he is concerned with the actual
behavior of courts. For the realist, the contractual relationship, like
law in general, is a function of legal decisions. . . .Where there is

58

See, e.g., T.

ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT

36 (1935) ("Obviously, 'law' can

never be defined."); Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1141, 1145 (1938)
("Those of us who have learned humility have given over the attempt to define law. "). Jerome
Frank, having tried to define law in Law and the Modern Mind, subsequently expressed deep
regret for this attempt:
I seriously blundered when I offered my own definition of the word Law. Since that
word drips with ambiguity, there was already at least a dozen defensible definitions. To add one more was vanity .... A more futile, time-consuming contest is
scarcely imaginable.
J. FRANK, supra note 9, at 46.
2 F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 9, at 62 (emphasis in original).
30 K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 60.
31 Cook, supra note 17, at 505.
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a promise that will be legally enforced there is a contract. So
conceived, any answer to the question.. . must be in the nature of
32
a prophecy based . . . upon past and present facts.
The realists also had little use for the concept of sovereignty.
Several realists defined law in terms of judicial behavior and emphasized the crucial role of judges. Arthur L. Corbin argued that, of all
the persons who express or declare rules or principles of human
action,
the judges have far the greatest influence, for wherever there is an
actual dispute they have the last word. What is the Constitution?
We do not know until John Marshall has spoken. Do our statutes
control us? Only in case the judges permit them, and only with the
meaning the judges give them. As for all the rest, their expressions
are only "academic. '33
Other realists advanced a broader conception of law, arguing that law
is "not merely what the judge does . . . but what any state official
does, officially." ' 34 What an official actually does may differ significantly from what he or she is supposed, presumed, or obligated to do.
In fact, some officials may "do one thing, some another, and the
courts now and again a third." ' 35 In short, a legal system may lack
the unity presupposed by Austin's theory of sovereignty.
A factor that probably contributed to this difference between
Austin and the realists is the dissimilar political and legal systems in
which they lived and worked. Austin was subject to a unitary system
in which the behavior of officials was more predictable than in the
diverse jurisdictions of the American federal system. He also lived
before the emergence of the panoply of executive and administrative
agencies that characterize the modern state. It is difficult to imagine
him writing, for example, that more "often than not, administrative
action is, to the layman affected, the last expression of the law on the case.
In such a situation . . . [it is] highly useful to regard it, for him, as
being the law of the case." ' 36 In any event, the realists virtually
ignored the idea of sovereignty that played such a central role in
Austin's conception of positive law.

11

F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE,

supra note 9, at 65-66.

33 Corbin, supra note 21, 3 YALE REV. at 236.
4 K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 31 (emphasis in original).
35 Id. at 30.
3' Id. (emphasis in original).
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B. Conceptions of Jurisprudenceand the Study of Law
1. Austin's "General Jurisprudence"
Austin and the realists espoused very different approaches to the
study of law. Although both Austin and the realists were profoundly
dissatisfied with established approaches and the bulk of legal scholarship, their dissatisfaction sprang from different roots. Consequently,
they prescribed different remedies for the ills they diagnosed.
Austin began to deliver his lectures on jurisprudence at the University of London in 1828. During this period, "English lawyers
thought of law as something to be learnt only by a process of imitation
in barristers' chambers and attorneys' offices. There were no professional examinations and neither the universities nor the professional
bodies taught law." ' 37 Austin believed that the results of these ideas
and practices were pernicious. He lamented that "the knowledge of
an English Lawyer, is nothing but a beggarly account of scraps and
fragments. His memory may be stored with numerous particulars, but
of the Law as a whole, and of the mutual relations of its parts, he has
not a conception." 38 Such fragmentary knowledge was evident even
' 39
in "the best of [the] English treatises."

Austin maintained that the development of the science of jurisprudence would eradicate these evils. He believed that jurisprudence
should have an analytical function, the essence of which is conceptual
clarification. He was primarily interested in general jurisprudence,
which addresses the "principles, notions, and distinctions which are
common to systems of law." 40 Although these ideas take different
forms in particular legal systems, "they are to be found more or less
nearly conceived; from the rude conceptions of barbarians, to the
exact conceptions of the Roman lawyers or of enlightened modern
jurists." ' 4 1

Concepts like duty, right, liberty, injury, punishment,

redress, law, sovereignty, and independent political society are necessary, Austin claimed, because "we cannot imagine coherently a system of law (or a system of law as evolved in a refined community),
without conceiving them as constituent parts of it."

42

37 Hart, Introduction, supra note 4, at xvii.
38 1 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES, supra note 2, at 468.
39 Id.

40 J. AUSTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 2, at 367.
41 Id. at 366.
11 Id. at 367. Austin also included several other ideas within the purview of general
jurisprudence. Although these principles are not necessary for a coherent understanding of a
legal order, they "occur very generally in matured systems of law." Id. at 369. The distinction
betweenjus personarum andjus rerum is an example. Austin maintained that because distinctions
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Austin's lectures on jurisprudence were designed to clarify these
universal concepts. He emphasized conceptual clarification for several
reasons, one of which was his belief in the close connection between
theory and practice. Because of this relationship, it "really is important . . . that men should think distinctly, and speak with a mean-

ing." 4 3 In addition, Austin believed that conceptual clarification was
essential for the development of law as a science.
At any rate, Austin stressed that general jurisprudence does not
involve ethical evaluation of positive laws. Rather, the business of this
science is the exposition of principles derived from existing legal
systems. At the same time, he emphasized the importance of the
science of legislation, the function of which is to "determine the test or
standard (together with the principles subordinate or consonant to
such test) by which positive law ought to be made, or to which positive
law ought to be adjusted." 44 Austin claimed that the sciences of
jurisprudence and legislation are related by "numerous and indissoluble ties."

45

Accordingly, "[i]t is impossible to consider Jurispru-

'
dence quite apart from Legislation.
These ideas gave rise to Austin's proposed reforms for legal
education. He advocated the establishment of an institution
46

like the Law Faculty in the best of the foreign universities ...

an

institution in which the general principles of jurisprudence and
legislation (the two including ethics generally), international law,
the history of the English law (with outlines of the Roman, Canon,
and Feudal, as its three principal sources), and the actual English
law (as divided into fit compartments), might be taught by competent instructors 47

Austin contended that this training would be highly useful in the
practice of law. Understanding the principles of general jurisprudence
would simplify "the acquisition of practical knowledge in the chambers of a conveyancer, pleader, or draftsman." ' 48 Exposure to general jurisprudence would also benefit young men "destined for public
life." ' 49 Their familiarity with the science would cause "the demand
of this sort "rest upon grounds of utility which extend through all communities, and which are
palpable or obvious in all refined communities, they . . . may be ranked properly with the
general principles which are the subjects of general jurisprudence." Id. General jurisprudence
thus presumes the existence of numerous similarities between different systems of law, the basis
of which is "the common nature of man." Id. at 373.
4' Id. at 55-56 (emphasis in original).
44 Id. at 366.
45 Id. at 6.
46 Id. at 373.
47 Id. at 389.
48 Id. at 380.
49 Id. at 389.
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for legal reform [to] be more discriminating, and also more imperative; much bad and crude legislation would be avoided."" 0
2. The Realists, Langdel, and the Study of Law
The realists were at least as dissatisfied as Austin with the study
of law and legal scholarship. Otherwise, they would not have contrasted so sharply the backward condition of the law with the status of
other "sciences." 5 ' They attributed this unsatisfactory condition to
various factors, one of which was a lack of conceptual clarity by legal
scholars. In this respect, Austin's dissatisfaction with legal study paralleled that of the realists, but that is the extent of their agreement.
The realists were, after all, reacting to a body of legal scholarship and
schemes of legal education that had not existed in England or America
during Austin's time. The most important development in this regard
was not the gradual professionalization of law, the immense growth in
the number of law schools, or the assumption by most major universities of a responsibility for legal education.52 Rather, the signal event
was the widespread acceptance of the case method as interpreted by
Christopher Columbus Langdell, for it was his ideas on this subject
and their influence on legal scholarship that the realists attacked.
Langdell, Dean of the Harvard Law School from 1870 to 1895,
contended that law is a science and, as such, consists of certain
principles and rules. He stressed that the mark of a "true lawyer" is
the ability to apply these generalizations "with constant facility and
certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs." 53 He maintained that the aim of every serious student of law should be to acquire
5

Id.

51

See, e.g., Bingham, Law Schools and the Future, 6 J.

LEGAL EDUC.

486, 498 n.3 (1953-54)

(scientific study of law had "advanced very little beyond the status of medical schools of the
sixteenth century"); Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REv. 761, 771-72 (1932)
("Lawyers today are about where the physicians were before Vesalius began to dissect in order
to discover what the human body was like."); Llewellyn, The Theory of Legal "Science, "20 N.C.
L. REV. 1, 13 (1941) ("[I]n this pre-pre-science of behavior relating to matters legal, we might
as well recognize that we are today hardly as far along as were the physicists of the Seventeenth
Century.").
Walter Wheeler Cook maintained that the traditional technique of the legal profession is
"from the point of view of present day ideas of logic and of scientific method . . . as
grotesquely inadequate for legal purposes as the childish mechanical notions of the nineteenth
century have shown themselves to be in the field of physics." Cook, Scientific Method and the
Law, 13 A.B.AJ. 303, 308 (1927). Indeed, he believed that the use of truly scientific methods
in the study of law "ha[d] never yet been tried." Id. at 303.
5' For a study of these and other developments in legal education, see Stevens, Two Cheers
for 1870: The American Law School, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 405 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn
eds. 1971).
53 C.

LANGDELL,

A

SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS Viii

(1879).
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this ability and that the best way to develop this skill is to learn how to
analyze cases.
Langdell believed that mastering this art would not require the
analysis of a tremendous number of cases, because legal doctrine
grows by a slow evolutionary process traceable in relatively few cases.
In fact, Langdell claimed that "[t]he vast majority are useless, and
worse than useless, for any purpose of systematic study." 5' 4 He
emphasized that the number of fundamental legal rules and principles
is "much less than is commonly supposed; the many different guises
in which the same doctrine is constantly making its appearance, and
the great extent to which legal treatises are a repetition of each other,
being the cause of much misapprehension." 5 5 Langdell maintained
that all of the sources of the science of law are available in printed
books; therefore, "'the library is the proper workshop of professors
and students alike; . . . it is to us all that the laboratories of the

university are to the chemists and physicists, all that the museum of
natural history is to the zoologists, all that the botanical garden is to
the botanists."'"5

The realists were unimpressed by Langdell's ideas. Although the
degree and sources of their dissatisfaction varied, a common criticism
was the inadequacy of the case method for predicting judicial decisions. William 0. Douglas called Langdell's case method a "misnomer," 57 because of its exclusive focus on judicial opinions. Such a
focus
grossly oversimplifies and distorts the nature of law. After all, law
is neither more nor less than a prediction of what a governmental
agency or other agency of control will do under a given situation. A
study of the legal literature exemplified by judicial opinions supplies part, but only part, of the material necessary to make such a
prediction. The other psychological, political, economic, business,
social factors necessary to complete that prediction are innumerable. The weakness of the old system was that all of these more
general and imponderable factors were eliminated from consider-

4 Id.
55 Id. at viii-ix.

" Record of the Commemoration, November Fifth to Eighth, 1866, on the Two Hundred
and Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of Harvard College 97-98 (1887), reprinted in A.
SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN, 1817-1967, at 175 (1967).
5 W.O. DOUoLAS, Educationfor the Law, in DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: THE ADDRESSES AND
PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM

0.

AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 279

described as a legal realist. See K.

DOUGLAS AS MEMBER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITIES

(J.

Allen ed. 1969). Douglas is one of the men Llewellyn
supra note 9, at 74.

LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE,
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ation. It was for that reason that the nonconformists in legal education began to raise disconcerting notes.58
The realists also criticized other alleged defects of the case method as it
had developed under Langdell's influence. One was the tendency to
derive rules and principles from the study of a few rather than all
reported cases, while another was the habit of formulating doctrine
independent of the actual decisions of courts. These practices, the
realists protested, were responsible for the substantial amount of legal
scholarship that lacked solid factual support. 9
These attitudes strongly conditioned the often harsh reaction of
some realists to the work of legal scholars like Samuel Williston and
Joseph Henry Beale. Cook observed that "a steadily increasing num511

W.

DOUGLAS,

supra note 57, at 280. Most of the nonconformists cited by Douglas were

legal realists.
59 One realist after another echoed these themes. "The literature of our law has been
prolific of instances," Bingham declared, "where superficial and partial analysis into a few
vague and utterly misleading generalities has removed an important topic of law almost beyond
the range of correct apprehension by one who is not ready to undertake an independent and
8
thorough investigation." Bingham, What Is the Law?, 11 MICH. L. REv. 1, 8 n. (1912). If
Felix Cohen is to be believed, our "legal system is filled with supernatural concepts, that is to
say, concepts which cannot be defined in terms of experience, and from which all sorts of
empirical decisions are supposed to flow." F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 9, at
48. Cohen adduced corporate entity, property rights, fair value, due process, title, contract,
conspiracy, malice, proximate cause, and "all the rest of the magic 'solving words' of traditional jurisprudence" as examples of such concepts. Id. at 45. Herman Oliphant was particularly concerned about the unsatisfactory responses ofjudges and scholars to the phenomenon of
change. He believed that "the last two hundred years ha[d] brought more changes in the
circumstances of men living together than the previous two thousand years had done."
Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.AJ. 71, 74 (1928). Students of law did not respond to
this situation, however, by refining legal concepts or rules. Instead, they expanded categories
6f analysis and thus dulled "the tools for producing the discrimination necessary for intimacy
of treatment." Id. at 74. This tendency, the "over-towering fact in Anglo-American legal
history of recent centuries," id., produced the "law's present classification of human activities,
[which] compels us to sit in places where life's game is no longer played. In pondering many of
our long prized abstractions, we study dead bodies from which the life we would know has
departed." Id. at 76.
These perceptions were the basis of Oliphant's indictment of the "orgy of overgeneralization," id. at 74, that had generated the unfortunate transition from stare decisis to stare dictis.
He particularly condemned the shift from "observation of judicial action to an excess of
concern about judicial utterances." Id. at 76. Legal scholars were no longer concerned with the
precise decisions of cases, but with broad principles arrived at independently of actual holdings. "If there be only one case in point," for example, "and that be in conflict with some
implication of our favorite universals, it is wrong-wrong on principle." Id. at 75. Oliphant
therefore concluded that although "[t]he spirit of the common law may still reside in the day to
day work of our judges. . . it has all but departed the body of their opinions and the writing of
scholars." Id. This spirit was also conspicuously absent from the commercialized legal encyclopedias and statements of the corpusjuris. Oliphant characterized these works as "hastily made
by stringing together judicial generalities, usually innocuous and frequently inconsistent and
by peppering them with cast citations either to the number of recent minimum or with the
abundance of an undiscriminated deluge." Id.
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ber of so-called-perhaps miscalled-'realists' have been subjecting
to critical analysis the presuppositions and modes of thought underlying the work of the men of Williston's generation." ' 0 One of these
presuppositions was the unity of the legal universe. Cook believed that
this notion is impossible to reconcile with the totality of judicial
decisions. The assumption that the law of contracts consists of a
unified body of doctrine, for example, can only be maintained by
empirically unacceptable methods. One must either completely ignore
some judicial decisions or fail to distinguish consistently between
actual holdings and dicta. In Cook's view, Williston's treatise on the
law of contracts illustrated both of these vices ;6 1 the "'legal universe,'
. . . as some of the newer writers see it, is far more complex than that
visualized by the more orthodox writers of whom Professor Williston
is an example."

' 62

Similar beliefs underlie the critical response of the realists to the
American Law Institute's first attempt to restate the law. In an effort
to clarify the content of the law, the Institute proposed to restate the
fundamental principles behind the "swamp of decisions." 6 3 Although the realists conceded the uncertainty of existing law, they
reacted very negatively to the Institute's prescription. The gravamen
of their complaint was that the Restatement's methodology was defective. Cook, for example, criticized the theoretical basis of the Restatement sections on jurisdiction. The root of the problem, he argued,
was not beginning with "the concrete phenomena of judicial decisions
as they occur and formulating theories primarily on the basis of
accurate observation of these phenomena.' '64
This critique represents the underlying basis of the realists' efforts to develop narrow rules or categories. A characteristic feature of
the realist movement was "[t]he belief in the worthwhileness of grouping cases and legal situations into narrower categories than has been
the practice in the past. "6 5 The realists maintained that the method
of refinement, "the orthodox technique of making distinctions, and
reformulating,"

66

should be

undertaken systematically; exploited consciously, instead of being
reserved until facts which refuse to be twisted by "interpretation"
force action. The departure from orthodox procedure lies chiefly in
80

Cook, supra note 17, at 497.

81 Id. at 499, 505, 514.
62 Id. at 514.
83 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE

52 (1923).

Cook, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 202, 222 (1935).
c K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 56.
Id. at 59.
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distrust of, instead of search for, the widest sweep of generalization
words permit. Not that such sweeping generalizations are not desired-if they can be made so as to state whatjudges do [or ought to do]. 7
This position presumes the existence of the case method, to which
most of the realists were sympathetic. Their objective was not to
discard the case method, but to rescue it from the abuses fostered by
the influence of Langdell's ideas. 68
3. The Behavioral Focus of The Realists
These criticisms heavily influenced the reforms that the realists
advocated for the study of law. Although they disagreed on the direction reform should take, the positions they adopted differed significantly from Austin's recommendations. This is not to imply that the
8 Id. at 59-60 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
8n Some of the realists, however, advocated more unorthodox reforms, such as empirical
research on the actual operation and effects of the legal system. A perception of the imperative
need to acquire such information largely inspired the foundation of the Institute of Law at the
Johns Hopkins University in 1928. The aim of the school was "the development of the
scientific study of law. All else [was] incidental." Cook, supra note 51, at 309. Achievement of
this objective required research of quite a different nature from that which Langdell advocated.
Walter Wheeler Cook emphasized that
the only way to find out what anything does is to observe it in action and not to
read supposedly authoritative books about it, or to attempt by reasoning to deduce
it from fundamental principles assumed to be fixed and given. The consequences of
this assumption is that only a small part of the work of the staff of the Institute will
be with books in libraries; by far the larger part will be concerned with the difficult,
time-consuming, and expensive task of gathering and interpreting the facts concerning the operation of our legal system.
Cook, Scientific Study and the Administration of Justice, 34 MD. ST. B.A. REP. 148 (1929).
For a provocative interpretation of the relationship between Langdell and the realists
which differs from that developed in this article, see G. GILMORE, supra note 8. Gilmore
believes that
the adepts of the new jurisprudence-Legal Realists or whatever they should be
called-no more proposed to abandon the basic tenets of Langdellian jurisprudence than the Protestant reformers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries proposed to abandon the basic tenets of Christian theology. These were the ideas that
"law is a science" and that there is such a thing as "the one true rule of law."
Id. at 87. Gilmore therefore maintains that "[r]ealist jurisprudence proposed a change of
course, not a change of goal." Id. at 100. Although this interpretation is defensible, it is, in
certain respects, quite misleading. First, some realists doubted that a science of law was
possible in the foreseeable future. See Frank, supra note 51, at 773; Llewellyn, supra note 51, at
10, 13, 14, 16, 22. Second, the conception of a science of law held by the more optimistic
realists was radically different from Langdell's. Although they used the same words-"science
of law"-to describe their goal, they sought, in effect, a different goal. Finally, the extent to
which the realists believed that the "one true rule of law" can be discovered by the right
approach varied. Some of them did indeed take positions which imply the existence of such a
rule. For striking expressions of this point of view, see Corbin, supra note 21, at 250, and K.
LLEWELLYN, DECIDING APPEALS, supra note 9, at 122. Other realists expressed opinions which
imply that there is no such thing as the one "true" rule of law. See note 119 infra.
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realists viewed conceptual clarification as unimportant. There is, after
all, an analytical component to "realistic jurisprudence." Holmes
declared that "it is well to have an accurate notion of what you mean
by law, by a right, by a duty, by malice, intent, and negligence, by
ownership, by possession, and so forth."16 9 Precisely for this reason,
he claimed that it would be advantageous to "master Austin.'' 7
Although the realists seldom mentioned Austin, they shared Holmes's
opinion of the value of conceptual clarification. Still, the realists
advocated a substantially different focus for the study of law from
Austin's.
The most prominent feature of the realist movement was the call
for study of the actual or probable behavior of judges and other
officials. In fact, this focus is the hub of the varied spokes of "realistic
jurisprudence." To be sure, the pursuit of this interest sometimes led
the realists in different directions. They disagreed, to an extent, about
the nature, implications, and rationale of a behavioral focus. These
considerations, however, should not obscure the unity of purpose that
pervaded the realist movement. Its participants shared a firm conviction of the imperative need to discover what officials have done, are
doing, and are likely to do. This belief prompted Hessel Yntema to
differentiate sharply legal positivism from legal realism: the "typical
interest of a genuine legal positivist is in logic and form, while the
interest of the legal realists in these aspects of law is in a degree
incidental to their interest in the function, operation, and consequences or, in other words, the substance, of law." ' 7 1 Thus, the
thrust of the realist movement deviates from the predominant emphasis of Austin's analytical jurisprudence. Recognition of this rather
obvious difference, however, necessarily invites the question of its
explanation.
Various factors conditioned the behavioral focus of the realists,
one of which was their perception of conceptual clarification as only
the first step in the development of a science of law. Felix Cohen
interpreted "realistic jurisprudence" to consist of a theory of the
nature of law, legal rules, legal concepts, and legal questions, the
essence of which is the definition of law as a function of judicial
decisions. 72 Although he appraised the utility of this definition very
highly, he insisted that it is "only a preliminary stage in the life of

0. W. HOLMES,
0'

supra note 20, at 86.

o Id. at 87.
71 Yntema, Jurisprudenceon Parade, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1154, 1164 (1941).
72 F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 9, at 69.
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legal science." 73 Joseph W. Bingham expressed a similar point of
view, criticizing Austin for
an attenuated artificial idea of the scope of jurisprudence, [which]
...has led to a distortion of the importance of analytical processes
and their verbal paraphernalia into an alleged basic pure science of
law. The two most famous proponents of this type of schools or
cults of jurisprudence are John Austin . . . and Hans Kelsen ...

Both are subject to the criticism that they mistake careful mechanical analysis and selection and definition of terms for the essence of
legal science instead of only incidental machinery of thought, useful to a far lesser degree as the logic of mathematics is useful to the
inquiries and understanding of natural scientists."
Cook was less critical of at least a certain kind of analytical jurisprudence. 75 At the same time, he recognized its limitations. Although
conceptual clarification "is an indispensable tool, it is not an all-sufficient one for the lawyer." ' 76 In particular, "analytical work merely
paves the way for other branches of jurisprudence, and . . . without

the aid of the latter satisfactory solutions of legal problems cannot be
reached. "1

77

The realists shared Cook's evaluation of the limitations of an
analytical jurisprudence. This attitude partly accounted for the realists' emphasis upon a behavioral focus in the study of law. They were
also acutely aware of the possible gap between the law-on-the-books
and the law-in-action. Although Roscoe Pound had emphasized the
significance of this particular distinction prior to the emergence of the
realist movement, 78 the realists were even more eager to stress the
divorce between "paper" and "real" rules or rights. They also emphasized that knowledge of the existence or extent of this gap can only
be developed through a focus on behavior:
73 Id.

" Bingham, Law Schools and the Future, 6 J. LEGAL EDouC. 486, 496-97 n.3 (1953-54).
7s Cook otherwise would not have appraised so highly Wesley N. Hohfeld's contributions
to the science of law. Cook, however, sharply distinguished Hohfeld's work from that of most
jurists in the analytical tradition. Cook interpreted these jurists as taking the position that
analysis of legal conceptions is an end in itself. Unlike them and, by implication, unlike Austin,
Hohfeld was primarily interested in legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning. In fact,
one of his "greatest messages" to the legal profession was his demonstration that "an adequate
analytical jurisprudence is an absolutely indispensable tool in the equipment of the properly
trained lawyer or judge- indispensable, that is, for the highest efficiency in the discharge of the
daily duties of his profession." Cook, Introduction, in W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 3-4 (Cook ed.
1919).
76 Id. at 4.
77 Id.
71 See Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
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The question is how, and how much, and in what direction, do the
accepted rule and the practice of decision diverge? More: how, and
how much, in each case? You cannot generalize on this, without
investigation. Your guesses may be worth something, in the large.
They are worth nothing at all, in the particular. . . . [T]he significance
of the particular rule will appear only after the investigation of the
vital, focal, phenomenon: the behavior. And if an empirical science
of law is to have any realistic basis, any responsibility to the facts,
[there is] no escape from moving to this position.7 9
4. Austin's Likely Reaction to The Realists' Behavioral Focus
Although Austin never addressed the behavioral point of view, °
he was dismayed by what he perceived to be the "growing bulk and
intricacy of the English law (a bulk and intricacy which must go on
increasing)." 8 1 His prescription for this evil was codification, 2 a
remedy which presupposes a greater belief in the utility of a general
jurisprudence than the realists maintained. Austin insisted, for example, that codification requires talents and knowledge that "cannot be
acquired by a merely empirical study of our own particular system,
and by the mere habit of applying its rules to particular cases in the
course of practice.' '83 Rather, the skills required for codification
demand "scientific study,"8 s4 the heart of which is general jurisprudence. This discipline
tends to fix in the mind a map of the law, so that all its acquisitions
made empirically in the course of practice, take their appropriate
places in a well-conceived system; instead of forming a chaotic
aggregate of several unconnected and merely arbitrary rules. It
tends to produce the faculty of perceiving at a glance the dependencies of the parts of his system, which ... is the peculiar and
striking characteristic of the great and consummate lawyer.85
9 K.

LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE,

supra note 9, at 17-18.

80 It is difficult to ascertain accurately how Austin would have responded to the realists'

behavioral focus. The realists raised questions that had not been of primary interest to Austin.
Moreover, the behavioral emphasis of the realists was conditioned by a set of circumstances
and problems unknown to Austin. Still further, there is a certain amount of tension between
different elements of Austin's jurisprudence. On the one hand, his work falls within the
tradition of British empirical philosophy. All of the utilitarians viewed themselves as empiricists. As such, Austin could not consistently attack the development of empirically verifiable
knowledge about the operation or effects of the legal system; nor could he attack the attempt to
describe, explain, or predict the behavior of judges and other officials or their interaction with
laymen. Still, Austin might regard these efforts as the wrong solutions to the problem.
81 2J. AUSTIN, LECTURES, supra note 2, at 1092.
82 See notes 184-96 and accompanying text infra.
83 2J. AUSTIN, LECTURES, supra note 2, at 1095.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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This passage reflects attitudes and beliefs that contrast sharply
with the realists' point of view. Their movement was characterized by
an emphasis on the American legal system. This emphasis mirrors the
realists' dissatisfaction with the attempt to develop a "useless quintessence of all systems, instead of an accurate anatomy of one." 86
Furthermore, the realists doubted that the corpusjuris has the kind of
underlying doctrinal unity presumed by Austin's science of general
87

jurisprudence.

II
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN AUSTIN AND THE REALISTS

Although their intellectual orientations differed somewhat, Austin and the realists did not see the world through entirely different
spectacles. In fact, their perspectives paralleled each other in several
respects. This observation facilitates assessment of the originality of
some of the realists' ideas. Certain themes of the realist movement
echo refrains that Austin strongly emphasized; others are modern
American refinements of his notions.
A. The Empiricism of Austin and The Realists
The most fundamental similarity between Austin and the realists
may be the assumption that all knowledge is ultimately derived from
observation and experience. If this is "empiricism," then both Austin
and the realists were empiricists. This is an important point of consensus because it significantly affected other areas of agreement.
Austin's empirical outlook is evident from various dimensions of
his philosophy of law. Although he believed that successful codification requires more than "merely empirical study of our own particular system," 8 8 this does not imply that he opposed empiricism.
Rather, it indicates his belief that the development of a good code
would require knowledge of both English law and the principles of
general jurisprudence. Austin felt that the latter should be derived by

O.W. HOLMES, supra note 20, at 87.
Despite important differences between Austin and Langdell, they were, in a sense,
spiritually closer to each other than either was to the realists. Both men presumed that
principles exist which provide a complete map of the law. They assumed that law has an
underlying unity of doctrine that can be mastered by the right kind of approach. As such, their
position sharply contrasts with the views of the legal realists.
" 2 J. AusTIN, LECTURES, supra note 2, at 1095.
"

17
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studying "the legal institutions which exist, or have existed, among
mankind, considered as actual facts."9
Austin's empirical orientation is also apparent from his view of
the close relationship between theory and practice. He insisted that
theory is "essential to practice guided by experience and observation."9 0 He strenuously denied that what is true in theory can be
false in practice. The foundation of this denial was his belief that
theory is a compendium of particular truths. Unless a theory is "true
of particulars, and, therefore, true in practice, it has no truth at all."'9
The legal realists also ascribed considerable import to the
"facts." Recall, for example, the realists' indictment of Langdellian
jurisprudence and their behavioral focus in the study of law. 92 Their
attitude toward the facts also underlies the term "legal realism."
Roscoe Pound accurately defined legal realism as "fidelity to nature,
accurate recording of things as they are, as contrasted with things as
they are imagined to be, or wished to be, or as one feels they ought to
be." 9 3 Of course, the desire to record accurately things as they are
does not sufficiently capture the distinctiveness of the realist movement. Nevertheless, a deep conviction of the need to develop generalizations supported by the facts was one of the bonds that united the
94

realists.

8 Book Review, 118 EDINBURGH REV. 222, 224 (1863). Austin's view reflects a characteristically Benthamite attitude. According to Leslie Stephen, "the strong point of Benthamism
• ..[was its] reverence for the facts. Knowledge was to be sought not by logical jugglery but by
scrupulous observation and systematic appeals to experience."

L. STEPHEN, LIFE OF SIR JAMES

FITZJAMES STEPHEN 123 (2d ed. 1895). In this sense of the term, Austin was a "Benthamite."
'0 J. AUSTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 2, at 49.
91 Id. at 50. For a good discussion of Austin's empiricism, see Morison, Some Myth about

Positivism, 68 YAL L.J. 212 (1958).
'2See notes 57-59 & 69-79 and accompanying text supra.
" Pound, The Callfor a RealistJurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697 (1931).
14 "My faith in jurisprudence," Llewellyn wrote, "has always rested on the need for
seeing the facts straight, as the beginning for the man of law-government." Llewellyn, What
Law Cannot Dofor Inter-Racial Peace, 3 VILL. L. REV. 30, 33 (1957). Llewellyn maintained that
the attempt to satisfy this need was the heart of the method of the "newer Jurisprudence." K.
LLEwELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 135. This interpretation may not be entirely

accurate, but the realists manifested a strong desire to learn "what goes on." Id. If some of
them believed that this goal could best be achieved by the development of an empirical science
of law, others regarded this objective as "too pretentious." Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U.
PA. L. REV. 223, 258 (1931). According to Frank,
many of those persons who follow Holmes are looking forward to years of patient
observation and description. They want that description in the homeliest terms.
There is very little of it in existence today [1931]. That is why some of Holmes'
followers squirm when this proposed program of observation and description is
referred to as "an empirical science of law." That label, they feel, is too "high-hat."
Frank, supra note 51, at 773. Still, this very statement presumes a strong commitment to
accurate observation and description of the facts.
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Austin and the realists thus shared an empirical "cast of mind."
This does not mean that their approaches to the study of law are
entirely acceptable from an empirical point of view. It can be argued
that neither Austin nor the realists developed particularly useful conceptual frameworks for the study of law or the behavior of officials.
The emergence of a "behavioral jurisprudence" in the last two or
three decades tends to reflect this criticism of the realists. 95 Moreover, some of the theories advanced by Austin and the realists may
lack a solid foundation in the facts. Austin attributed a necessity and
universality to certain of his ideas that is difficult, if not impossible,
for empirical generalizations. His conceptions of law and sovereignty
have also been characterized as inconsistent with at least some of the
facts.9" Critics of the legal realists have lodged similar charges against
many of their ideas.9 7 Nevertheless, both Austin and the realists
firmly believed that satisfactory theories should be based upon the
facts.
B. The Distinction between Law and Morality
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of legal positivism is a sharp
distinction between law and morality. A similar distinction is evident
in the writings of the realists as well. If the claim that an unjust law is
no law at all is the core of natural law, then both legal positivism and
legal realism fundamentally contravene that tradition of jurisprudence.
Very few jurists protested against the alleged confusion of law
and morality as vigorously as Austin. Instances of such confusion
would, he asserted, "fill a volume" 98 and are "one most prolific
source of jargon, darkness, and perplexity." 99 Dissatisfaction with
this tendency underlies Austin's efforts to clarify the province, or
scope, of jurisprudence, and to distinguish law properly, and improp95 For discussion of the relationship between legal realism and judicial behavioralism, see
W. RUMBLE, supra note 5, at 175-79; Ingersoll, Karl Llewellyn, American Legal Realism, and
Contemporary Legal Behavioralism, 76 ETHICS 253 (1966); Verdun-Jones, supra note 22.
" See J. BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE (1901); H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); H. MAINE, LECTURES ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS (1914).
9' See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 96; works cited in W. RUMBLE, supra note 5, at 1 n.1,
29 n.53. For criticisms representative of various perspectives, see B. CARDOZO, THE SELECTED
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 7-46 (M. Hall ed. 1947); H.L.A. HART, supra note
96; R. POUND, CONTEMPORARY JURISTIC THEORY (1940); Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U.
PA. L. REV. 429 (1934); Lucey, Natural Law and American Legal Realism: Their Respective
Contributions to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society, 30 GEO. L.J. 493 (1942); Moskowitz, The
American Legal Realists and an Empirical Science of Law, 11 VILL. L. REV. 480 (1966).
88 J. AUSTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 2, at 184.
99 Id. at 371.
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erly, so called. He began from the premise that law is a product of
will, something that is made rather than discovered. Positive law (law
"strictly so called"),' 0 0 the subject matter of jurisprudence, consists of
the commands of the sovereign. Positive morality consists of the moral
rules that exist in a given society. Some of these rules are law "properly so called," while others do not warrant such classification. 10 1
Divine law consists of the commands of God, which may be either
expressed or tacit. The principle of utility is the index for these tacit
commands and the measure or test of the ethical goodness or badness
of human laws.102 Austin strenuously insisted, however, that these
laws exist regardless of their ethical value. "The existence of law is
one thing; its merit or demerit is another. .

.

. A law, which actually

exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it, or though it vary from
the text, by which we regulate our approbation and disapprobation. ''

03

Austin objected to the confusion of law and morals on both
theoretical and practical grounds. First, he believed that such confusion impedes understanding of established law and its enforcement.
The foundation of this belief was his assertion that the "most pernicious laws, and therefore those which are most opposed to the will of
God, have been and are continually enforced as laws by judicial
tribunals." 0 4 Positive laws creating the legal right to own slaves are
an example. To contend that this right does not exist because it ought
not to exist is to ignore the actual law "in every age, and in almost
105
every nation."
Austin also objected to the confusion of law and morality on
political grounds. The theory that an unjust law is no law at all not
only impedes understanding of the realities of law enforcement; it also
fosters indiscriminate resistance to positive laws. Though Austin believed that disobedience is ethically justifiable on utilitarian grounds,

100Id. at 8.
101 Id. at 123.

Id. at 7, 46-47, 54.
Id. at 184. This last proposition is the essence of Austin's distinction between law and
morality. Confusion of law and morality results in the failure to recognize that an established
law that is bad from an ethical point of view is still a law. The exemplar of this confusion,
according to Austin, was Sir William Blackstone, the influential eighteenth century legal
commentator. See generally W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (19th ed.
1870). All of the utilitarians criticized Blackstone, but none assailed him more.vehemently than
Austin. In particular, he strongly disagreed with Blackstone's view that "human laws which
conflict with the Divine law are not binding, that is to say, are not laws." J. AuSTIN, PROVINCE,
supra note 2, at 185.
004 J. AuSTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 2, at 815.
105 Id. at 187.
102

103

1008
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he emphasized that "to proclaim generally that all laws which are
pernicious or contrary to the will of God are void and not to be
tolerated, is to preach anarchy, hostile and perilous as much to wise
06
and benign rule as to stupid and galling tyranny." 1
Although Austin dissociated law from morals, he acknowledged
possible relations between them. He affirmed "without hesitation"
that "all human laws ought to conform to the Divine laws."' 0 7 He
emphasized that the substance of legal, moral, and ethical rules often
overlaps.' 0 8 He even acknowledged that moral rules may be more
effective regulators of human conduct than positive law. 109 Nevertheless, he insisted that a positive law that conflicts with moral or ethical
rules is still a law.
This theme was also quite popular among the most influential
forerunners of the realists in American jurisprudence. In "The Path
of the Law," for example, Holmes explicitly professed the need to
distinguish between law and morality. 110
Several passages in
Holmes's address have a pronounced Austinian flavor. "The first
thing for a business-like understanding of the matter [the study of
law]," Holmes claimed, "is to understand its limits, and therefore
... at once to.

.

.dispel a confusion between morality and law.""'

He emphasized the "danger, both to speculation and to practice, of
confounding morality with law. 11 2 Despite his highly critical attitude toward this confusion, Holmes acknowledged that morality often
influences law. Indeed, he claimed that "law is the witness and
external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral
development of the race. The practice of it . . .tends to make good

citizens and good men.""13 Moreover, he was careful to point out
that his emphasis on the distinction between law and morals had
100 Id.

at 186.
Id. at 184.
108Id. at 159.
'09 Id. at 160-61.
10O.W. HOLMES, supra note 20, at 71.
l Id. at 73.
112 Id. at 78. Although Holmes's critique was not identical to Austin's, their rationales
were
strikingly similar, as is evident from Holmes's assertion that
when we speak of the rights of man in a moral sense, we mean to mark the limits of
interference with individual freedom which we think are prescribed by conscience,
or by our ideal, however reached. Yet it is certain that many laws have been
enforced in the past, and it is likely that some are enforced now, which are
condemned by the most enlightened opinion of the time, or which at all events pass
the limit of interference as many consciences would draw it. Manifestly, therefore,
nothing but confusion of thought can result from assuming that the rights of man in
a moral sense are equally rights in the sense of the Constitution and the law.
Id. at 74.
"' Id. at 73.
107
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"reference to a single end, that of learning and understanding the
law.'"

4

5
The realists' favorable references to Holmes were legion."
Their praise would have been ill-informed or disingenuous if it did not
16
reflect agreement with his attempts to distinguish law from morals.
Their own writings also reflect a strong desire to distinguish clearly
between the law as it is and as it ought to be. "Law is law, whether it
be good or bad,"" 7 Felix Cohen wrote, and no legal realist would
have disagreed with him. Cohen specifically defended his definition of
law on the ground that it "reveals the concept of law as something
purely positive or natural, involving no connotations of approval or
disapproval. We are thus able to avoid the confusions following inevi8
tably upon commendatory definitions of law." "1
To the extent that the legal realists took this position, their point
of view was indistinguishable from Austin's. Of course, their reasons
for criticizing the confusion of law and morals were not identical to
his. Unlike Austin, several realists expressed views that imply that
ethical judgments are subjective." 9 Nevertheless, they fully agreed
114 Id. Holmes did not specifically acknowledge Austin's contribution even though Austin
had advanced an identical argument 65 years earlier. John Chipman Gray was less reluctant to
give credit where it was due. Gray believed that the "great gain in its fundamental conceptions
which Jurisprudence made during the last century was the recognition of the truth that the Law
of a State or other organized body is not an ideal, but something which actually exists." He
insisted that the established law in this sense is "not that which is in accordance with religion,
or nature, or morality; it is not that which ought to be, but that which is," and maintained that
to "fix this definitely in the Jurisprudence of the Common Law, is the feat that Austin
accomplished." J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 94 (2d ed. 1921).
115 See, e.g., F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 9, at 54, 61; J. FRANK, supra note
9, at 253-60; K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 29, 46 n.18, 181, 507, 516, 517;
Cook, Oliver Wendell Holmes: Scientist, 21 A.B.A.J. 211 (1935); Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and
Non-Euclidian Legal Thinking, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 568 (1932); Yntema, Mr.Justice Holmes' View of
Legal Science, 40 YALE L.J. 696, 703 (1931). For criticism of the realists' interpretations of
Holmes, see Mechem, The Jurisprudenceof Despair, 21 IOWA L. REv. 674 (1936) and Pound,
Fifty Years ofJurisprudence, 51 HARV. L. REv. 777, 792 (1938).
11 In fact, several of the realists specifically endorsed Holmes's efforts in this direction. See,
e.g., Cook, supra note 115, at 212; Frank, supra note 115, at 570; Yntema, supra note 115, at
698-99.
117 F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 22, at 15.

Id. at 14. Cohen also cited Blackstone's conception of law as an example of such
confusion. Id.
11g See Bingham, supra note 59, at 2-3; Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 COLUM.
L. REV. 609, 612 (1923); Yntema, The Rational Basis of Legal Science, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 925,
943 (1931). For discussion of this strand in the realist movement, see E. PURCELL, supra note
11, at 91-94, 159-78.
This argument for distinguishing between law and morals more closely parallels the
position of a twentieth century positivist such as Hans Kelsen than that of Austin. For Kelsen's
ethical noncognitivism, see H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE xvi (A. Wedberg
trans. 1961). Austin, a convinced utilitarian, believed that the goodness or badness of positive
laws is objectively determinable.
11
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with him that the confusion of law and morals had perniciously
affected the study of law. Llewellyn maintained, for example, that the
"temporary divorce of Is and Ought for purposes of study" is one of the
"peculiar" and "characteristic marks of the movement." 120 The
legal realists thus agreed that
during the inquiry itself into what Is, the observation, the description, and the establishment of relations between the things described are to remain as largely as possible uncontaminated by the
desires of the observer or by what he wishes might be or thinks
ought (ethically) to be. More particularly, this involves during the
study of what courts are doing the effort to disregard the question
what they ought to do.' 2
The realists' assessment of the role of the "is" and the "ought"
in the application or interpretation of law diverged to some extent
from Austin's characterization of law and morals. The realists' analysis of the judicial process implies that the "field of free play for
Ought in appellate courts is vastly wider than traditional Oughtbound thinking ha[s] ever made clear." 1 22 Austin was not a traditional ought-bound thinker who ignored the realities of judicial decisionmaking. Nevertheless, he did not estimate so generously the room
for the free play of the "ought" in appellate courts.
The apparent discord between Austin and the realists on this
issue does not, however, negate their fundamental agreement about
the relationship between law and morals. The appellate courts' consideration of the "ought" does not necessarily signify a link between
law and morality. The "ought" behind a judicial decision may be a
personal preference or a judgment about policy, rather than a moral
or ethical principle. 1 23 A utilitarian like Austin would reject the
distinction between judgments of policy and ethical appraisals because
the latter are, in his view, reducible to the former. Nonetheless,
120

K.

LLEWELLYN,

JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9,at 55, 57 (emphasis in original). Llewellyn

observed that the divorce between the "is" and the "ought" in the study of law is "temporary," id. at 55, arguing that to men "who begin with a suspicion that change is needed, a
permanent divorce would be impossible." Id. at 56. This attitude appears to be incompatible
with Austin's thesis. After all, Austin insisted that the business of the science ofjurisprudence is
the exposition rather than the evaluation of positive law. J. AUSTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 2, at
366. Nonetheless, in an important sense, Austin also believed that the divorce between the
"is" and "ought" in the study of law is temporary. In fact, he was no less interested than the
realists in the reform of law. One of the many signs of his deep concern with this problem was
his belief in the vital importance of the science of legislation, the focus of which is "positive law
as it ought to be." Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
121 K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE,
122 Id. at 70.
12

H.L.A.

HART,

supra note 9, at 55-56 (emphasis in original).

supra note 96, at 200-01.
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Austin would insist that judgments of policy may be mistaken. He
would argue also that judicial decisions that establish bad policy are
law until they are overruled or undermined by "interpretation."
Therefore, despite their differences about the free play of "ought" in
the decisions of appellate courts, Austin and the legal realists took
fundamentally similar positions with respect to the relationship between law and morality.
C. Law and Sanctions
The conceptions of law held by Austin and the realists also
presuppose or imply a connection between law and sanctions. Austin
claimed that law properly so called consists of commands, which, in
his view, are "the key to the sciences of jurisprudence and
morals.' 1 4 The difference between commands and other significations of desire is not a matter of linguistic form or style. Certain
expressions of desire that take the form of requests in reality may
constitute commands, while other wishes that appear to be imperatives in fact may not be commands. The crucial factor for distinguishing commands from other expressions of desire is "the power and
purpose of the party commanding to inflict an evil or pain in case the
desire be disregarded."' 2' 5 This pain or evil is the essence of a
sanction, the liability to which is the basis of Austin's conception of
legal obligation.
Austin's argument implies that the possibility of incurring a
sanction is a necessary condition for the existence of law. Holmes
evinced a similar assumption in his conception of law. He began from
the premise that the objective of the study of law is the "prediction of
the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the
courts."' 2 6 A legal right is "only the hypostasis of a prophecy-the
imagination of a substance supporting the fact that the public force
will be brought to bear upon those who do things said to contravene
it. '1 127 Similarly, a legal duty is "nothing but a prediction that if a
man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or
that way by judgment of the court. "' 28 These ideas explain Holmes's
insistence on the utility of the "bad man's" perspective for the purpose of understanding law:

124

J.

AUSTIN,

PROVINCE,

supra note 2, at 13 (emphasis in original).

12-5Id. at 14.

O.W.

1216
127
128

HOLMES,

Id. at 397.
Id. at 72.

supra note 20, at 72.
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If you want to know the law and nothing else you must look at it as
a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which
such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who
finds his reasons for conduct . . . in the vaguer sanctions of con-

science. 129
The bad man wants to know, in other words, if and how sanctions will
be applied to actions he is considering. The same point of view
underlies Holmes's conception of law as "prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious." 1 3 0
A similar concern with sanctions is evident in the various conceptions of law advanced by the realists. Their interest in the actual
behavior of officials arose in part from the belief that official behavior
ultimately determines whether individuals will be compelled or permitted to engage in certain conduct. This notion explains, for example, why "'[r]ules' in the realm of action mean what rules do; 'rules' in
the realm of action are what they do. The possible application and
applicability are not without importance, but the actual application
and applicability are of controlling importance." 131 A similar consideration underlies the insistence of some realists that the test for the
existence of a right is the availability of a remedy. If my right to
something is violated, but no one will be compelled to stop violating
it, or to compensate me for its violation, then my right is only a string
of words. "Denial of all remedy, direct and indirect," Corbin writes,
"is the total negation of legal 'right'; and a denial of the most effective
remedies cuts down in exact proportion the character and value of the
'rights' that may still be given some minor forms of recognition." 132
A similar line of thought explains why some realists emphasized the
importance of procedures. Max Radin observed that there "is a
sense, and a proper sense, in which procedure is the essence of the
law. . . . And certainly to know what a person's rights are, is a futile
33
and sterile piece of knowledge unless one knows how to get them." 1
Of course, the realists' claims about the relationship between law
and sanctions did not totally conform to Austin's ideas. He maintained that even the remote possibility of incurring a sanction is
sufficient to create a legal obligation. 1 34 In contrast, several realists
129 Id.

at 74.

Id. at 75. "I don't care a damn if twenty professors tell me that a decision is not law,"
Holmes wrote, "if I know that the Courts will enforce it." 1 HOLMES-LASKi LETTERS: THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI 115 (M. Wolfe ed. 1953).
131 K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 34-35 (emphasis in original).
132 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 294, at 73 (1950).
133 Radin, The Achievements of the American Bar Association, 26 A.B.A.J. 19, 23 (1940).
11 J. AUSTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 2, at 16.
130
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took positions that imply that the existence of legal duties or rights
depends upon the probability of incurring sanctions. 135 Various factors accounted for this difference, one of which was the realists'
perception that legislatively prescribed sanctions are frequently ignored or distorted by judges and law-enforcement officials:
The object of a realistic legal criticism will be not the divine vision
which follows the words "Be it enacted:" but the probable reaction
between the words of the legislature and the professional prejudices
and distorting apparatus of the bench, between the ideas that
emerge from this often bloody encounter and the social pressures
that play upon enforcing officials. Words are frail packages for
legislative hopes. The voyage to the realm of law-observance is
long and dangerous. Seldom do meanings arrive at their destination intact. Whether or not we approve of storms and pirates, let us
be aware of them when we appraise the cargo.136
Another factor influenced the realists' departure from Austin's
ideas about law and sanctions. It was the belief that the probability of
incurring sanctions, rather than the mere possibility thereof, strongly
influences the layman's choice of conduct. According to Frank, for
example, the "law in the sky, above human experience, is valueless to
the wayfaring man .

. .

. To mere humans, law means what the

courts have decided and will decide, and not vague, 'pure' generalizations." 1 37 Llewellyn, echoing this argument, declared that "[i]f, as I
claim, what . . . judges do is vastly more important than what . . .

judges say, that can be only because importance to other people, to the
laymen, the poor devils to whom they do it, appears to me the primary
measure of importance. "13 8 Llewellyn also emphasized the importance of administrative activity. Although the decisions of judges are
central to any analysis of the relationship between law and sanctions,
"there is a vast body of other officials whose actions are of no less
importance. ' 139 To the laymen affected by them, these actions are
more important than judicial behavior. For
[t]he actions of these other officials touch the interested laymen
more often than do those of the judge; increasingly so, and apparently increasing at a rising rate of increase as the administrative

135

See, e.g., F.

COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE,

supra note 9, at 65-66; K.

LLEWELLYN,

JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 10-11, 22; Bingham, Science and the Law, 25 GREEN BAG 162,

164-65 (1913); Cook, Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457, 475 (1934).
130 F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 9, at 240.
17 J. FRANK, supra note 9, at 55.
138 K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 11, at 89-90 (emphasis in original).
139 K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 29-30.
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machine gains in function and in force. More often than not,
administrative action is, to the laymen affected, the last expression of
14 0
the law on the case.
This point of view quite obviously reflects the evolution of the
modern state since Austin's time. The vast expansion of the "administrative machine" is a fact of life in most societies. This development
has increased the possibility of divergence between the law "on-thebooks" and the law "in action." To this extent, the realists' point of
view can be interpreted as a typically modern refinement of Austin's
position. At any rate, the differences between them should not obscure their fundamental agreement about the interrelation between
law and sanctions.
D. The Reform and Evaluation of Law
Austin and the realists not only held conceptions of law that are
similar in a number of respects, they shared a strong interest in legal
reform and developed somewhat similar approaches to the evaluation
of law. As a disciple of Jeremy Bentham, one of the English legal
system's harshest critics, Austin maintained that "no other body of
Law, obtaining in a civilized community, has so little of consistency
14
and symmetry as our own." 141 He assailed the "enormous bulk," 1
the "unrivalled intricacy,' '1 43 the "matchless confusion and obscurity,' 1 44 and the "multitude of wanton distinctions' ' 1 45 of English
law, the "empire of chaos and darkness.' ' 46 Although these strictures were directed at the uncertainty of English law, Austin criticized
14
many of its rules as inexpedient as well. 1
The legal realists similarly were disenchanted with established
law. They thought of law as a means to social ends, the efficacy of
which "needs constantly to be examined." 1 48 The realists developed
a "conception of society in flux, and in flux typically faster than the
law, so that the probability is always given that any portion of law
needs reexamination to determine how far it fits the society it purports

140 Id. at 30 (emphasis in original).
141 1 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES, supra note 2, at 467.
142

Id.

"I Id. at 58.
144 Id.
145 Id.

Id.
147J. AUSTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 2, at 64-65.
148 K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 55.
146
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to serve. ' 149 This conception may be one of the most influential
50
contributions of the realist movement.1
Austin's and the realists' cognate interests in legal reform were
accompanied by common result-orientation approaches to the evaluation of law. Austin, an ardent utilitarian, claimed that rules should be
evaluated on the basis of their effect on the general happiness. He
stressed that "legislation ought to be governed by actual experience of
the wants and exigencies of mankind," 5 ' and agreed with Bentham
that a "body of law cannot be spun out from a few general principles
assumed a priori, but must be founded on experience of the subjects
and objects with which law is conversant." 2 Law, in other words,
"should be determined by general utility, not drawn out from a few
53
arbitrary assumptions . . . called the law of nature."
If the theory of natural law to which Austin alluded entails the
deduction of a body of law from a priori principles, then the legal

realists joined Austin in disputing that theory. Although Llewellyn
stressed that they had not developed a normative program, he observed that a "likeness of method in approaching Ought-questions is
apparent." 154 The heart of this approach and a distinctive character-

149 Id.

" Hessel Yntema, for example, opined that the "significant achievement of American legal
realism has been to imprint in legal thinking the concept of relativity in the adaptation of
positive law to social change." Yntema, American Legal Realism in Retrospect, 14 VAND. L. REV.
317, 329 (1960). See also T. ARNOLD, FAIR FIGHTS AND FOUL: A DISSENTING LAWYER'S LIFE 68
(1968). There Thurman Arnold spelled out some of the changes for which he felt the realists
deserve much of the credit:
[S]ince the days of Frank Roosevelt, there has been a startling revolution in our
attitudes toward law, legal procedures, and the sanctity of the Constitution of the
United States. The old idea that the common law was a seamless web built case by
case throughout the ages, all of which had been reconciled into legal principles by
irrefutable logic, has all but disappeared. Legal procedure is no longer an abstract
science: its delightful complications, its technical traps, and its abstract logic are no
longer available to the skilled craftsmen of that dark science. The Constitution of
the United States that in the early days stood as an unyielding obstacle to practical
legislation attempting to relieve human needs and correct social injustices has
gone. . . . It is no longer available as a weapon against social reform of any kind.
For studies of the implications of realism for constitutionalism, see E. PURCELL, supra note 11;
Belz, Changing Conceptions of Constitutionalismin the Era of World War II and the Cold War, 59 J.
AM. HIsT. 640 (1972); Belz, The Realist Critique of Constitutionalism in the Era of Reform, 15 AM. J.
LEGAL HIsT. 288 (1971).
1 2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES, supra note 2, at 679.
152 Id.
153 Id.

154 K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 72. For studies of the ethical theories of
the legal realists, see E. GARLAN, LEGAL REALISM AND JUSTICE (1941); E. PURCELL, supra note

11; Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1961);
McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention, 50 YALE L.J. 827, 834 (1941).
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istic of the realist movement, he maintained, was an "insistence on
evaluation of any part of law in terms of its effects."' 55 The exponents of realistic jurisprudence also demonstrated "fairly general
agreement that effects of rules, so far as known, should be taken
1 56
account of in making or remaking the rules."

This similarity between Austin and the realists did not, however,
lead to identical approaches to ought-questions. One difference between them was the realists' call for empirical studies of the effects of
law. These inquiries were viewed as essential in order to replace
"armchair speculations" with "informed evaluations." 157 The development of such appraisals "without study of the persons whom law
affects is impossible."' 58 This difference between Austin and the
realists, however, is one of emphasis rather than principle. In fact, the
realists' call for empirical investigation of the effects of law is, in one
sense, a logical outgrowth of utilitarianism.
Austin not only argued that positive law must be evaluated on the
basis of its social effects, but also proposed a test under which these
effects should be judged: the long-range consequences of rules, or rule
changes, on the general happiness. Austin believed, thus, that the
principle of utility is the proper standard to employ in appraising the
effects of law or legal change. In fact, he devoted a substantial portion
of his only published book' 59 to the definition and defense of this
principle.

160

As a rule, the realists did not share Austin's interest in questions
of ethical theory. The realists were not philosophers of law-the issue
of which ethical standard should be used to evaluate the effects of law
was not a pressing question for most of them. Those who expressed
views on the subject took positions that run the gamut. Some realists
appear to have accepted noncognitivist ethical theories. 16 Others,
like Cook, developed ideas very similar to those of John Dewey, the
great philosopher of pragmatism. 162 A few realists, including Llewellyn and Frank, even expressed a sympathetic attitude toward natural

1'sK. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 57.
156 Id. at 72.

15'Id. at 56.
i5 Id. at 67.
1s9J. AUSTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 2.

16' Id. at 33-118. Austin's utilitarianism had a stronger impact upon his legal theories than
has generally been recognized. See Rumble, supra note 2, at 139-80.
161 See note 119 supra.
161 See Cook, Walter Wheeler Cook, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 59, 60 (1941). For a discussion of the impact of Dewey upon Cook, see

Verdun-Jones, supra note 22, at 250-56.
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law. 163 On balance, however, the realists advocated a result-oriented
evaluation of law that sharply contrasts with an appeal to natural law
or rights. To this extent, their point of view parallels Austin's utilitarian approach, though the two do not coincide perfectly.

III
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION AND CODIFICATION

Austin and the realists developed both similar and contrasting
ideas about judicial legislation. The most notable contrast may be
their divergent accounts of how judges reach decisions. Austin's description of this process assumes that it is highly rational, an assumption which a number of realists explicitly criticized. 1 64 Nevertheless,
many of Austin's ideas about judge-made law adumbrated views
subsequently expressed by the legal realists. In this respect, Austin
may have been, aside from Holmes, the most important forerunner of
the realist movement in nineteenth century Anglo-American jurisprudence.

A. Austin
The resolution of specific disputes through the application of law
65
is, according to Austin, the hallmark of judicial decisionmaking1
Elucidation of his conception of how judges make law requires, thus,
an explanation of how they apply it. Although Austin recognized that

judges can reach decisions without applying old or new rules, he
apparently regarded such decisions as exceptional and, in any case,
1"3

J.

FRANK,

supra note 9, at xx (1963); K.

LLEWELLYN, DECIDING

APPEALS, supra note 9, at

122; K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 111-15. The significance of the passages
cited can be exaggerated. According to Purcell, "Frank ultimately drew closer to the natural
law school than any of the other realists. . . . [H]e had come a long way from the philosophical
implications of Law and the Modern Mind." E. PURCELL, supra note 11, at 173. This interpretation exaggerates how close Frank drew to the natural law school. The most convincing evidence
of this exaggeration is Frank's chapter on natural law in J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 346-73
(1949), in which he stated that it is "high time that we put an end to the device of referring to
Nature as the justification for any particular social or economic program or method of
government. That device has always led to the worst kind of casuistry. It is oblique, indirect,
lacking in forthrightness." Id. at 353. See also id. at 348, 350, 351. For an excellent discussion of
Llewellyn's attitude toward natural law, see W. TWINING, supra note 9, at 216-27.
1'4 See W. DOUGLAS, TnE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975, at 8, 33 (1980); J. FRANK, supra note 9,
at 33, 36, 100-11, 148-49; Corbin, supra note 21, at 250; Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the
Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468, 480 (1928). This emphasis reflects both the realists'
observations of judicial behavior and the influence of psychological and other theories that
emerged after Austin's death. See K. LLEWELLYN, DECIDING APPEALS, supra note 9, at 12, 58;
W. RUMBLE, supra note 5, at 69-72.
185 2J. AusTIN, LECTURES, supra note 2, at 621.
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wholly indefensible. 16 6 The dominant method by which courts reach
decisions is through the application of law-classifying the facts and
subsuming them under rules. Most cases do, and all cases should,
involve the application of law in this sense.
Austin classified the law that judges apply into two categories:
established rules, which are derived from statutes or precedents, and
newly-created rules. Judges legislate to the extent that the law they
apply consists of newly-created rules. Thus, the vast majority of cases
fall into two basic categories. In the first, judges only apply rather
than create rules; in others, judges make the rules, then proceed to
apply them.
Despite not uncommon interpretations of his ideas, Austin was
no stranger to the phenomenon of "judiciary law.' 167 In fact, he
ridiculed the "childish fiction employed by our judges, that judiciary
or common law is not made by them, but a miraculous something,
made by nobody, existing from eternity, and merely declared from time
to time by the judges." 168 Austin was unable to understand "how
any person who has considered the subject can suppose that society
could possibly have gone on if judges had not legislated."' 9 He also
insisted that many of the new rules introduced by English judges were
derived from "their own conceptions of public policy or expediency. "17
Furthermore, Austin contended that judges frequently introduce new rules "under colour of interpreting statute law, or of
getting by induction at prior judge-made law." 171 Thus, a new rule,
"disguised under the garb of an old one, is applied as law to new
cases. '' 172

166 Id. at 581-82.
167 Id. at 620.
168

Id. at 634. Although Austin did not specifically mention Blackstone in this context, he

must have disagreed with the learned commentator. Blackstone had earlier expressed the view
that the "judgment, though pronounced or awarded by the judges, is not their determination
or sentence, but the determination and sentence of the law" and that an English judge "is only
to declare and pronounce, not to make or new-model, the law." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 103, at

258, 305 (emphasis in original).
'69 J. AUSTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 2, at 191.
170 2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES, supra note 2, at 539.
171 Id.

at 637.

Id. at 531. The process of spurious interpretation ex ratione legis is an example. The judge
who employs this method of construing a statute does not reason from the literal meaning of
statutory language. Instead, he either restricts or extends it in accordance with his own
conception of what is necessary to achieve the purpose of the law. Such restrictions or
extensions are only "pretended applications of the statute." Id. at 635. In reality, they are part
of a "process of legislative amendment, or. . . correction" rather than genuine interpretation.
Id. at 629.
172
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Austin defended judicial legislation on several grounds, one of
which is the ambiguity of certain legal terms. 7 3 Established rules
that contain these terms are "hotbeds of competing analogies. The
indefiniteness is incorrigible. A discretion is left to the judge. Questions arising on them . . . are hardly questions of interpretation or

induction, for though the rule were explored and known as far as
possible, doubt would remain." 174 Austin also contended that judicial legislation is a necessary response to the negligence or incompetence of the sovereign legislature in "almost every community." 1 75
He claimed that
unless the work of legislation had been performed mainly by subordinate judges, it would not have been performed at all, or would
have been performed most ineffectually: with regard to a multitude
of most important subjects, the society would have lived without
law; and with regard to a multitude of others, the law would have
remained in pristine barbarity. 76
Austin believed that judicial legislation is not only necessary, but
of "obvious utility" 1 77 as well. Judge-made law is particularly benefi-

cial, he argued, as a means of adapting law to social and other
changes. As an example of the system's response to the failure of
judges to develop new rules, Austin cited the creation of courts of
equity. The need for these courts arose from the unwillingness of
judges of the common law courts to "do what they ought to have
done, namely to model their rules of law and of procedure to the
growing exigencies of society, instead of stupidly and sulkily adhering
to the old and barbarous usages." 1 78 Indeed, Austin went so far as to
deny that "there is any danger whatever in allowing them [the judges]
that power which they have in fact exercised, to make up for the
negligence or the incapacity of the avowed legislator." 1 79 He therefore lashed out at the "too great
rules. '"180

. . .

respect [of judges] for established

' Words such as "libel," "lunacy," :'prodigality," "reasonable time," and "reasonable
notice" are examples.
1742 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES, supra note 2, at 1001 n.20.
175 Id. at 612.
178

Id.

177 Id.
178 Id. at 647.
179 J. AUSTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 2, at 191.
...2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES, supra note 2, at 646. This evaluation of judicial legislation

prompted one of Austin's infrequent criticisms of Jeremy Bentham. Bentham was one of the
severest critics ofjudge-made law in the history of Western jurisprudence. He condemned it as
a "mock," "sham," "bastard," and "dog" law, 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMy BENTHAM 235-36
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To the extent that he advocated these ideas, Austin was indisputably a forerunner of the legal realists. Still, his analysis of judicial
legislation extended beyond these ideas to claims quite unlike those of
the realists. Although Austin extensively praised the benefits of judicial legislation, he also adamantly objected to its numerous disadvantages. These include: the relative inaccessibility and unknowability of
judge-made law; the difficulty of accurately determining the ratio
decidendi of a case; the lack of any certain test for determining the
weight of a precedent; the ex postfacto character of the rules that judges
make; the narrowness of judge-made rules;"" and the bad effect of
2
judicial legislation on the symmetry of the corpusjuris.11

Austin attached the most importance to the uncertainty that
judicial legislation supposedly fosters. Positive law, in his view, should
provide a guide for conduct. Austin maintained that judge-made law
is difficult to find, to know, to predict, and therefore, to follow. It is,
in other words, a very uncertain guide. When judges legislate, the
new rules that they introduce are by definition ex post facto. In this
context, the uncertainty of judicial legislation is a source of injustice.
This indictment of judiciary law underlies Austin's enthusiasm
for codification. Despite his criticisms of Bentham,' Austin shared
his predecessor's belief in the utility of codifying the corpus juris.'8 4
The major reason Austin adduced for the expediency of codification
was the inefficacy of judicial legislation. He insisted that a mere
enumeration of its "great defects' 8 s 5 and "monstrous evils" 18 8 is
"amply sufficient to demonstrate . . . that codification is expedi-

ent. "187

Indeed, Austin claimed that "no judicious or candid man

(J. Bowring ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as WORKS], which is "disgraceful to men," 3 id. at
206, and a "wretched substitute to real and genuine law," 9 id. at 8. Despite his veneration for
Bentham, Austin could not accept his condemnation of judicial legislation. Bentham should
have blamed judges not for making law, but "for the timid, narrow, and piecemeal manner in
which they have legislated, and for legislating under cover of vague and indeterminate
phrases." J. AUSTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 2, at 191.
1' Because of the narrowness of judge-made rules, the "exigencies of society are provided
for bit by bit, in the slowest and most inefficient manner." 2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES, supra note 2,
at 658.
182 If the corpusjuris comprises both statutory and judiciary law, then
the entire legal system . . . is necessarily a monstrous chaos: partly consisting of
judiciary law, introduced bit by bit, and imbedded in a measureless heap of particular judicial decision, and partly of legislative law struck by patches on the judiciary
law, and imbedded in a measureless heap of occasional and supplemental statutes.
Id. at 660 (emphasis in original).
183

See note 180 supra.

3 J.

BENTHAM, WORKS,
LECTURES,

2 J. AUSTIN,
181 Id. at 660.
187 Id. at 662.
185

supra note 180, at 205, 209-10.
supra note 2, at 666.
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will doubt ... that a well-made statute is incomparably superior to a
rule of judiciary law,"'18 8 largely because the former is much more
knowable than the latter. Of course, Austin acknowledged that even
the best code is unlikely to so condense and simplify the law that the
189
bulk of the community will know much of it.

Nonetheless, he

argued that the law could be "so condensed and simplified that lawyers
may know it: And that, at a moderate expense, the rest of the community may learn from lawyers beforehand the legal effect of transactions
in which they are about to engage.

'190

Austin's critical attitude toward judicial legislation is also evident
from his very concept of codification. He conceived of a modern code
as a "complete body of statute law, intended to supersede all other law
whatever.""'9 Codified rules would be "the only positive law obtaining in the community.'1 92 To be sure, he recognized that "no code
can be perfect" 193 and acknowledged that94the growth of judiciary law
"cannot . . . be prevented altogether." 1
Nevertheless, he insisted
0 and "narrow
that it should be confined to a "moderate bulk'"'
9o
In short, in the best of all possible worlds the amount of
lines."'
judicial legislation would be inconsiderable.
B. The Realists
Several of Austin's ideas about judicial legislation adumbrated
positions subsequently taken by the legal realists. One example is their
belief in the existence and utility of a significant amount of judgemade law. 197 Another is their critique of the pretenses for obscuring
the introduction of new rules. 98 At the same time, Austin expressed
some views on this subject with which the realists would have strongly
disagreed.
The most important example of this last dimension of Austin's
thought may be his defense of codification. His arguments presuppose
that judicial legislation could, and should, be reduced to the bare

18 Id. at 661.
189 Id. at 653.
190

Id. (emphasis in original).

191 Id. at 636.

19ZId. at 649.
'o

Id. at 675.

194

Id.

195 Id.

11) Id. at 1028.
197 K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 55, 70, 72.
'88 SeeJ. FRANK, supra note 9, at 114-15, 148-49; K. LLEWELLYN, DECIDING APPFALS, supra

note 9, at 5-6, 38, 40, 121, 124, 125-26, 133-34; and Frank, supra note 94, at 267.
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minimum. Nothing similar to this attitude is evident in the literature
of the legal realists. Most of them did not explain fully their opinions
on the possibility and desirability of codes. Therefore, it is impossible
to elucidate their reaction to Austin's analysis of codification with
complete certainty. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that they would
have disagreed with the ideas Austin developed on codification. In
particular, the realists would argue that not even the best code could,
or should, eliminate judge-made law to the extent that Austin had
desired.
This response may be inferred from the views that Frank and
Llewellyn expressed about codification. Frank maintained that unchanging application of codes is "impossible."' 9 9 European experience with allegedly gapless codes had, in his view, confirmed this
judgment. Frank proffered several reasons for the failure of these
efforts to construct unvarying bodies of law, one of which was the
scope and rapidity of socio-economic change. 20 0 He also observed
that even the wisest legislators command a limited vision of the future:
[T]he history of Continental law . . .[demonstrates that] a code

cannot be stable, it must be adaptive. Even in a relatively stable
society, no one can foresee all future combinations of events....
Situations are bound to occur which the legislature never contemplated when enacting the statutes. Then the incompleteness of the
20
code calls for judicial law-making. '
Frank also believed that a comprehensive, gapless code of laws
would become a straightjacket, impeding necessary and useful
changes. Since this result would be socially intolerable, judges would
be forced to change and adapt the terms of the code surreptitiously.
This practice, inevitably, would increase rather than decrease legal
uncertainty. Judges would develop forced "interpretations" of the
code and obscure what they would actually be doing-making law.
This process may create the appearance of certainty, but in fact it
20 2
"increases legal contingency and doubt."
supra note 9, at 190.
200Id. at 188-89.
201 Id. at 189.
202 Id. at 191. Frank also criticized the notion of a complete body of statutory law as
perpetuating the "basic legal myth," id. at 12, the essence of which is the illusion that "law
either is or can be made approximately stationary and certain." Id. Frank claimed that the
desire for a complete code of laws is indicative of the power of "the old dream of legal finality
and exactitude," id. at 203, concluding that codification reflects a "childish belief in legal
finality . .. [that] is and will ever be based upon illusion." Id. at 193.
It was no coincidence, Frank asserted, that many proponents of an all-sufficient code also
espoused the command theory of law. Frank cited Austin as a typical example of this class of
109 J. FRANK,
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Despite these criticisms, Frank disclaimed an intent to reject
every conceivable kind of code. He emphasized that his critical remarks should not be interpreted as a "blanket indictment of wise
codification which aims at simplicity and flexibility rather than completeness and finality."12 0 3 The sort of code Frank advocated differed
20 4
significantly, however, from the type that Austin favored.
Llewellyn saw greater benefits from codification. Otherwise, he
would not have expended such a vast amount of time and energy
drafting the Uniform Commercial Code.20 5 A conspicuous feature of
the Code is the significant role that courts must play in the development of its provisions. This idea reflects Llewellyn's belief that
"'semi-permanent Acts must envisage and encourage development by the
court' )206

" '[b]orderline,

doubtful, or uncontemplated cases are

inevitable.'" 2 0 ' The Code therefore requires a liberal interpretation
of its provisions:
"This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended
to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will provide its own
machinery for expansion of commercial practices. It is intended to
make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to be developed
by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and
practices." 208
Of course, the Uniform Commercial Code was not intended to
give courts carte blanche in interpreting its provisions. The proper
construction of the Act "'requires that its interpretation and application be limited to its reason. .

.

. The Act should be construed in

thinkers. Id. According to Frank, Austin's conception of law was as childish and oversimplified
as his faith in codification, id., and represented "almost a replica of the child's want that his
father shall be an omniscient, omnipotent law-maker and giver of commands." Id. at 194.
Llewellyn objected to Frank's explanation of the basic legal myth. See note 215 and
accompanying text, infra.
203 Id. at 192 n.*.
"' This is evident from Frank's endorsement of the Swiss Civil Code. He portrayed it as
seeking "simplicity and flexibility, not detailed, complete regulation. It is 'more like an outline
of legal principles than a body of provisions purporting to regulate all legal relations."' Id. at
192. Indeed, Frank even stated that "a code deliberately devised with reference to the
desirability of growth and stated in terms of general guidance and flexible principles may some
day prove to be the way out of some of the difficulties of legal administration in America." Id.
at 311.
20' For an excellent discussion of Llewellyn and the Uniform Commercial Code, see W.
TwNING, supra note 9, at 270-340. Although the Uniform Commercial Code was the product
of a collaborative effort, "there is no doubt that Llewellyn was easily the most important single
figure." Id. at 271. See generallyJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1 (2d
ed. 1980).
20' W. TwINING, supra note 9, at 304 (emphasis in original).
207 Id. at 322.
208 Id. at 322-23.
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accordance with its underlying purposes and policies.' ""09 The Code
was drafted in the hope that lawyers and judges "would adopt 'the
Grand Style' in their approach to it."1210

The Grand Style means that

"every current decision is to be tested against life-wisdom, and . . .
the phrasing of the authorities which build our guiding structure of
rules is to be tested and is to be vigorously recast in the new light of
what each new case may suggest either about life-wisdom, or about a
cleaner and more usable structure of doctrine. "211
Llewellyn contrasted the Grand Style with the Formal Style. The
latter involves precisely the kind of approach that Austin advocated
for applying the terms of a code. Under the Formal Style, "the rules
of law are to decide the cases; policy is for the legislature, not for the
courts, and so is change even in pure common law.' '212 Judges who
had perceived their function in this manner "sought to do their deciding without reference to much except the rules, sought to eliminate the
impact of sense, as an intrusion." 213
Thus, both Frank and Llewellyn rejected the kind of code that
Austin favored. Llewellyn, however, ascribed greater value to codification than did Frank. This difference reflects, among other things,
their conflicting appraisals of the possibility and desirability of legal
certainty. Llewellyn, for example, expressed the opinion that law, "in
the sense of decision, is in fact much more predictable, and hence
more certain than [Frank's] treatment would indicate." 2 14 Llewellyn
also maintained that "even adventurous spirits want some footing to
adventure from. That need is practical."

21 5

Unlike Llewellyn, Frank claimed that law "always has been, is
now, and will ever continue to be, largely vague and variable." 216
The fundamental reason for this uncertainty is fact-skepticism, a
notion which implies that the reactions of judges or jurors to the facts
of most cases are inherently unpredictable.21 7 Frank classified the
proponents of realistic jurisprudence into two groups, rule-skeptics
and fact-skeptics. The rule-skeptics, of whom Llewellyn was perhaps
"the outstanding representative," 2 1 8 focused on appellate courts and

Id. at 323.
Id. at 312.
2' K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 217.

209
210

212 K. LLEWELLYN, DECIDING APPEALS, supra note 9, at 38.
213 Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).
214 K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 107.

115Id. at 108.
218 J. FRANK, supra note 9, at 6.
217 J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 163, at 74.

218Id. at 73.
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strived for greater legal certainty. From their point of view, it is
"socially desirable that lawyers should be able to predict to their
clients the decisions in most law-suits not yet commenced. ' 219 Uncertainty exists because the "paper" rules used for predicting judicial
decisions are unreliable, a correctable defect. Replacing such "paper"
rules with "real" rules that describe the actual uniformities in judicial
behavior would markedly improve the predictability of judicial decisions.
In contrast to the rule-skeptics, the fact-skeptics focused on trial
courts. According to Frank, the fact-skeptics maintained that even the
accurate formulation of "real" rules would not markedly increase
legal certainty. They believed that "it is impossible, and will always
be impossible, because of the elusiveness of the facts on which decisions turn, to predict future decisions in most (not all) law-suits not
yet begun or not yet tried." '2 2 0 The fact-skeptics therefore argued
that "the pursuit of greatly increased legal certainty is, for the most
part, futile-and that its pursuit, indeed may well work injustice. 221 Thus, the fact-skeptics did not strive to increase legal certainty. Rather, their objective was "increased judicial justice.' '222
These ideas engendered Frank's and Llewellyn's difference of
opinion on the subject of codification. Fact-skepticism implies the
inevitability of a tremendous amount of legal uncertainty at the trial
court level. A fact-skeptic could therefore entertain only the most
limited expectations about the benefits of codification. For this reason,
the distance between Frank and Llewellyn may have been as great as
that between Llewellyn and Austin.
Even so, all of the realists would criticize Austin's expectations
for codes as too optimistic. His support of codification assumes that a
comprehensive set of legal rules can be drafted that will control or
dictate judicial decisions. This assumption was unacceptable to the
realists, who criticised it on various grounds. Corbin set the tone for
others by emphasizing that "however 'well-settled' the rules may be,
their application to life is always uncertain. A rule lives only in its
application; apart from that, it is a dead, inert thing. A new and
223
different application of the rule is the creation of a new rule."Corbin left no doubt of his conviction that new and different applications of established rules are inevitable. He therefore disputed the

219
220
221
222

'

Id.
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id.
Corbin, supra note 21, at 239.
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assumption that syllogistic reasoning on the basis of these rules can
prevent the development of new rules. To be sure, in
a superficial aspect, the application of rules to cases may seem to be
a deductive process; a pre-existing general rule is the major premise from which the judge arrives at a particular conclusion applicable to John Doe. In fact, however, the law in its growth and
application is an inductive process. The supposed pre-existing rule
is a mere assumption of the court. . . . [Y]ou can get out of a major
premise all you put into it. . . . In all cases the judge must con-

struct his own major premise, and this he does not find any easy
2

matter.

24

This belief contributed to the realists' distrust of "the theory that
traditional prescriptive rule-formulations are the heavily operative factor in producing courts decisions." 2 2 5

This distrust is the essence of

the rule-skepticism that pervaded the realist movement. Many factors
conditioned this skepticism besides the conviction that cases cannot be
decided solely by syllogistic reasoning. 226 First, the realists believed
that a large number of competing precedents exists in most cases, each
of which might justify conflicting decisions. Second, they maintained
that precedents and statutes are subject to a wide range of interpretations. Third, the realists recognized the ambiguity inherent in legal
language. Fourth, they shared a perception of rapid and extensive
change in the society regulated by law. A fifth consideration was the
impact of psychological theories, most notably the concept of rationalization. Finally, the realists stressed the importance of the attitude of
judges in determining how they exercise their "sovereign prerogative
of choice. "

22 7

Although Austin recognized these considerations, he did not attribute as much weight to them as did the legal realists. For example,
consider their respective analyses of how the ratio decidendi of a case
may be determined. Austin acknowledged the difficulty of this
process 228 but claimed that it is surmountable. He argued that the rule
of a case can be established by the following formula:
Looking at the general reasons alleged by the Court for its decision,
and abstractingthose reasonsfrom the modifications which were suggested by
221 Id. Corbin referred to a number of legal questions, the answers to which are uncertain, in

order to illustrate his point that cases "cannot be decided merely by constructing a syllogism."
Id. at 240.
225 K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 56 (emphasis in original).
22' For a detailed discussion of these factors, see W. RUMBLE, supra note 5, at 48-106.
227 O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 239 (1952).
222 2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES, supra note 2, at 650.
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the peculiaritiesof the cases, we arrive at a ground or principle of decision
which will apply universally to cases of a class, and which like a
2 9
statute law, may serve as a rule of conduct.1
In contrast to Austin, the realists tended to emphasize the existence of competing grounds or principles of decision. Felix Cohen
argued, for example, that the "search for a logical formula that will
determine precisely what rule each decision implies is a wild goose
chase starting from a logical confusion, ' 230 the essence of which is
"ignorance of the logical fact that no particular proposition can imply
a general proposition." 2 31 He therefore concluded that none of the
rules supposedly established by prior cases "has any logical priority:
courts and lawyers choose among competing propositions on extra-

logical grounds.'

'232

Nevertheless, the contrast between Austin and the realists should
not be exaggerated. The degree of and reasons for rule-skepticism
varied substantially from one realist to another.23 3 Austin could be
characterized as a moderate rule-skeptic. As such, he did not differ as
much from some realists as from others. Aside from this, some of the
factors that account for rule-skepticism are subject to modification and
control. Rule-skepticism is, after all, a theory of the less-than-controlling impact of established rules on judicial decisions. As such, it is
compatible with the belief that rules exist or can be developed that
would and should guide judicial decisions. Llewellyn observed that the
realists believed that "there is less possibility of accurate prediction of what
courts will do than the traditional rules would lead us to suppose, ",234 but he
also recognized their efforts to discover "the factors thus far unpredictable,
ingood part with a view to their control. "235 Nevertheless, the realists
would have criticized Austin's estimate of the extent to which legal
rules can dictate-as distinguished from guide-decisions in most
cases. The realists would likely have agreed with Corbin that it "may
assist towards certainty to reduce various branches of the law into the
229 Id. at 622.
20 F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 9, at 88 (footnote omitted).
21 F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 9, at 34 n.47.
212 Id. at 34 n.47. For a similar view, see Oliphant, supra note 59, at 73, 159.
'23For statements which minimize the impact of established rules on judicial decisions, see
J. FRANK, supra note 9, at 8, 118, 138, 155, 252, 267-68; L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 19, 214,
215, 258 (1930); K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 11, at 14; Oliphant, supra note 59, at 159; Yntema,
supra note 164, at 478-83. For statements which ascribe a heavy impact to at least some
established rules, see K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 9; K. LLEWELLYN,
DECIDING APPEALS, supra note 9, at 179; Bingham, supra note 59, at 21; Frank, "Short of Sickness
and Death" : A Study of Moral Responsibility in Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U. L. REv. 545, 588 (1951).
22

K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 60 (footnote omitted).

Id. at 61 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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form of a statutory code, but uncertainty remains. Society does not
stay put; and if the code lags behind, it is no longer the governing
law.' '136

The realists would also have recommended a more flexible code
than Austin because they believed that a substantial amount of judicial legislation is both inevitable and desirable. Underlying this attitude is a more sympathetic evaluation of common law methods of
adjudication than Austin demonstrated. For example, very few realists were as critical as Herman Oliphant of the shortcomings of legal
scholarship, particularly the transition from stare decisis to stare dic"
tis. 2 37

His very indictment of the latter presupposes, however, a

strong endorsement of the former. Oliphant extolled the spirit of stare
decisis on several grounds. He maintained that this method demonstrates a thoughtfulness about consequences, cautiousness in considering only "immediate problems," 23 8 and carefulness in illuminating
these difficulties "from the glow of the prudence and insight which its
own experimentation patiently forges.' '239 Stare decisis affords us
both the "counsel of experience" and the "latitude of trial and error." 2

40

Thus,

[w]ith eyes cleared of the old and broad abstractions which curtain
our vision, we come to recognize more and more the eminent good
sense in what courts are wont to do about disputes before
them ....

[T~he decision of a particular case by a thoughtful

scholar is to be preferred to that of a poorly trained judge, but the
decision of such a judge in a particular case is infinitely to be
preferred to a decision of it preordained by some broad "principle" laid down by the scholar when this and241a host of other

concrete cases had never even occurred to him.

These attitudes explain why Oliphant described stare decisis as
the "greatest contribution of our common law and of our people to the
art of human government. 2 42 As such, his point of view illustrates
what Llewellyn could have meant when he wrote, "Still wholly within
the tradition of our law, [the realists] strove to improve on that
tradition.' '243 In contrast, Austin was, in a sense, outside of the
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Corbin, supra note 21, at 245.

237 See Oliphant, supra note 59.
211 Id. at 162.
239

Id.

240 Id. at 75.
241 Id. at 159.
242 Id. at 162.
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K.

LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE,

supra note 9, at 57.
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common law tradition. At least his commitment to the ideal of codification reflects dissatisfaction with the practices that Oliphant-praised.
Austin's attitude toward codification also embodies a belief in an
elegantiajuristhat the realists did not share.
C. The Significance of the Differences between Austin and The Realists
Thus, the realists would have disagreed with Austin about the
extent to which a good code could and should eliminate judicial
legislation. Because Austin believed that not even the best code could
entirely eliminate judicial lawmaking, this difference- is only one of
degree, not of fundamental principle. Furthermore, the difference is
not as significant as it might at first appear. Despite his belief that a
good code is both possible and desirable, Austin was pessimistic that it
would ever be enacted. He maintained, in effect, that until we arrive
at the promised land, a substantial amount of judge-made law is
inevitable and expedient.
Austin claimed that the utility of judge-made law varies with the
kind of legal system in which it occurs. Judiciary law has little or no
place in the ideal corpusjuris, the foundation of which is a comprehensive code. In the absence of such a code, however, the law judges
make is superior to statutory law. Its benefits have244thus outweighed its
substantial costs in "almost every community.
Austin concluded that "there is more of stability and coherency
in judiciary law, than might, at the first blush, be imagined. '2 45 2 In
4
fact, he asserted that judicial respect for precedents is "too great." 1
He also took the position that judge-made rules are in practice less
uncertain than statutory law. He emphasized not only that "unless a
statute be well made, it commonly is more uncertain than a rule of
judiciary law," '2 47 but also that judicially created rules are in fact
244

2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES', supra note 2, at 612. Austin would not have reached this

conclusion unless he believed, unlike Bentham, that judges do not arbitrarily reach decisions.
In fact, Austin described five important restraints on judicial behavior. The law judges make is
limited by public opinion, sovereign legislatures, and, in the case of lower courts, by courts of
appeals. Id. at 644-45. Judges are also restrained by their perceptions of the reaction of the bar
to their decisions. Judicially created rules are, in reality, the joint product of judges and of the
"private lawyers who by their cunning in the law have gotten the ear of the judicial legislators." Id. at 645. This control is so important, Austin believed, that it prevents deviations from
existing law that are inconsistent with "the interests of the community, or, at least . . . the
interests of the craft." Id. He optimistically believed that the two sets of interests "do, in the
main, chime." Id. Finally, judges manifest a high regard "for the interests and expectations
which have grown up under established rules: or under consequences and analogies deducible
from them." Id. at 646.
215 Id. at 647.
246 Id.

at 646.
247 Id. at 661.

technically superior to existing statutory rules. Indeed, Austin even
stated that "the law of every country which was made by judges has
24
been far better made than . . . statutes enacted by the legislative."
Austin believed that the technical superiority of judge-made rules is
the major reason for the sovereign's acquiescence in judicial legislation . 249 This situation is likely to continue until legislatures are much
better qualified than they have been in the past, a possibility he
doubted would ever be realized.
Although Austin believed that the benefits of judicial legislation
have outweighed its costs, he refused to believe that this calculation is
written into the nature of things. The drafting and implementation of
a comprehensive and ideal code of laws is unlikely, but not impossible. The realists' disagreement with this notion reflects, in part, a
differing understanding of the limitations of legal rules as a means to
control or dictate judicial decisions. Austin and the realists also appraised somewhat differently the costs and benefits of judicial legislation. Although Austin obviously was more conscious than many of the
realists of what he believed to be the disadvantages of judge-made law,
the practical significance of these differences is not immense. Austin
and the realists disagreed largely about the place of judicial legislation
in a highly problematical future. They would have agreed that, in the
meantime, judges will and should continue to make law.
CONCLUSION

This study's examination of the relationship between the ideas of
Austin and the legal realists provides the basis for a number of important conclusions. First, there are realistic elements in Austinian positivism as well as positivistic dimensions to legal realism. Austin and
the realists shared an empirical orientation that conditioned other
similarities in their ideas. Although they ascribed different degrees of
importance to conceptual clarity and precision, they agreed that it is
important. They also developed conceptions of law that are similar in
several respects. Furthermore, their approaches to the evaluation of
law demonstrate a common result-orientation. Finally, Austin and the
realists emphasized the wide scope of judicial legislation in the legal
systems of their respective countries.
At the same time, Austin's intellectual and professional orientations differed significantly from those of the realists. These differences
may have influenced the numerous tendencies within the realist move248 J. AUSTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 2, at 191.

24' 2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES, supra note 2, at 612.
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ment that have no parallel in Austin's jurisprudence. First, the realists
took a more pragmatic approach to the definition of law than did
Austin. Second, the realists developed conceptions of law that emphasized the decisions of officials and the likelihood of sanctions. Moreover, the exponents of realistic jurisprudence stressed the actual behavior of officials. Although the realists' approaches to the study of
law branched out in many directions, their common behavioral focus
contrasts sharply with the thrust of Austin's analytical jurisprudence.
In addition, few traces of his enthusiasm for a detailed and complete
code of laws are evident in the realist movement. Unlike Austin, the
realists stressed the inevitability of a large amount of judicial legislation, largely because of a belief in the inherent limitations of legal
rules, which is not found in Austin's analysis.
The legal realists thus developed various ideas that Austin did not
in any way foreshadow. The significance of these differences varies. In
some respects, the realists attempted to answer questions that Austin
had not raised. In other respects, the realists and Austin gave different
answers to the same question. Regardless, awareness of the differences between them is necessary for assessing what is distinctive about
2 50
legal realism.

250

This Article's comparison of Austin and the realists is not, by itself, sufficient to analyze

the distinctiveness of the realist movement. Some of the realists' ideas that have no analogue in

Austin's writings were to a greater or lesser extent adumbrated by other jurists, such as Justice
Holmes, John Chipman Gray, and Roscoe Pound. Analysis of the relationship between their
ideas and those of the realists is essential for determining the distinctiveness of the realist

movement. Even so, the realists owe a much less heralded debt to John Austin, one which this
study has sought to explain.

